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An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted
by Non-Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions
That Have Adopted Uniform Commercial
Code Section 2-318 (Alternative A)
William L. Stallworth*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Article and a forthcoming follow-up Article is to
identify some of the general principles that explain case law developments under Uniform Commercial Code section 2-318.1 There are many
fine commentaries in this area,' but in the final analysis it is still hard
to discern the general legal principles guiding the developments in case

law. As some of the commentaries openly admit, the case law in this
area seems confusing." One reason for this is that both "remote"
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law; Ph.D., Stanford University, 1982; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1979; B.A., Cornell University, 1970.
The author wishes to acknowledge the support of colleagues and 'students at the
University of Dayton School of Law.
1. Alternative A to section 2-318 provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his
home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
2. See, e.g., Alex Devience, Jr., The Developing Line Between Warranty and Tort
Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, Does 2-318 Make a Difference?, 2
DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 295 (1990); David B. Gaebler, Negligence, Economic Loss, and the
UC.C., 61 IND. LJ. 593 (1986); William K Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of Contract Over Tort, 44 U. MIuMi L REV. 731 (1990);
Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement,
Once More Into The Void, 67 B.U. L REv. 9 (1987); 2 FRED 0. HARRIS & ALPHONSE
L SQuniuNTE, WARRANTY LAw IN TORT AND CONTRACT ACTIONS 155-97 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Devience, supra note 2, at 295; John F. Kamin, Note, The Extension
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purchasers4 and nonpurchasers' have attempted to use section 2-318 to
obtain standing' to sue for breach of warranty The remote purchaser
is typically a buyer who is suing a vendor in the chain of distribution

other than the immediate seller." The nonpurchasers who try to use
section 2-318 include members of the purchaser's family or household,'

the purchaser's house guests," the purchaser's employees," social
guests' or invitees," and even bystanders. 4 Some courts permit the

of Implied Warranty Protection To Employees of a Purchaser (reviewing Whitaker v.
Lian Feng Machine Co.), 14 S. ILL U. LJ. 123 (1989). For an overview of the law in
this area, see HARRIS & SQuLAE, supra note 2, at 155-97; JAMES J. WHrrE & RoBFirr S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Ch. 11 (3d ed. 1988); 2 WILLIAM D.
HAwILAND, U.C.C. SERIES § 2-318 (1992).
4. See, e.g., Flow v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 633 P.2d 383 (Ariz. 1981); Perfetti v.
McGhan Medical, 662 P.2d 646 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Szrama v. Alumo Prods. Co., 462
N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870 (0kl.
1979). The term "remote purchaser" is defined ilfra part ILD.
5. See, e.g., Milbank Mut Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 244 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. 1976);
Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973); Westlake v. Big
Town Supermart, Inc., No. 49809, 1985 WL 3982 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1985). The
different types of "nonpurchasers" are discussed infra parts M.D and I.E.
6. See, e.g., D. Brit Nelson, Is Privily Still Required In A Breach of Express
Warranty Cause of Action for Personal Injury Damages, 43 BAYLOR L REv. 551
(1991). Section 2-318 confers standing to sue for breach of warranty under Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code. This Article will use terms like "section 2-318
plaintiff" as shorthand to refer to the plaintiffs who file breach-of-warranty claims
pursuant to section 2-318. A legal purist might say that it is inaccurate to use such
terminology because section 2-318 does not provide an independent cause of action.
Rather, it merely confers standing to sue under other provisions of the Code (e.g.,
sections 2-314 and 2-315, discussed infra part I).
7. In this Article, remote purchasers and nonpurchasers are collectively referred
to as "non-privity plaintiffs" due to the lack of privity with the defendants. The term
"lack of privity" is discussed infra part ILD.
8. See infra part II.D.
9. See, e.g., Lane v. Barringer, 407 N.E.2d 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (purchaser's
mother); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 376 N.E.2d 143 Mass. App. Ct. (1978) (purchaser's
niece).
10. See, e.g., Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 217 A.2d 71 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965)
(purchaser's guest injured while using a bicycle purchaser bought for his daughter);
Handrigan v. Apex Warwick, Inc., 275 A.2d 262 (R.I. 1971) (purchaser's friend injured
in a fall from a ladder while helping paint purchaser's house).
11. See, e.g., Weaver v. Ralston Motor Hotel, Inc., 218 S.E.2d 260 (Ga. Ct App.
1975) (purchaser's employee, a truck driver, injured when truck became disabled).
12. See, e.g., Curlee v. Mock Enters, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding plaintiff was not the purchaser's house guest because accident occurred on
purchaser's boat).
13. See, e.g., Crews v. W.A. Brown & Sons, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 924 (N.C. Ct. App.
1992); Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 500 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), overruled
in part on other grounds, Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987); Steckal v. Haughton Elevator Co., 449 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1983).
14. See, e.g., Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973). As
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purchaser's family members to sue for breach of warranty under the
Code despite the absence of privity of contract with the defendant
seller, 5 but in other cases, warranty actions instituted by members of
the purchaser's family have been dismissed on the grounds of lack of
privity. 6 Similarly, some courts permit the purchaser's employees to
sue for breach of warranty, 7 but other courts dismiss such actions for
lack of privity." By the same token, some courts permit "bystanders"
to sue for breach of warranty," but other courts dismiss such actions
on lack of privity grounds.20 Sometimes section 2-318 is involved in

litigation between corporations,"' but in other cases the courts have
ruled that corporations lack standing to sue under section 2 -3 18.'

used in this Article, the term "bystander" refers to people who are neither purchasers
nor users; for example, a pedestrian who is injured when a defective automobile runs
out of control.
15. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 194 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. CL
App. 1972) (purchaser's mother); Harris v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 23 Mass.
App. Dec. 169 (Mass. Dist. CL 1962) (purchaser's minor son); Milbank Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Proksch, 244 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. 1976) (purchaser's father).
16. See, e.g., Lane v. Barringer, 407 N.E.2d 1173 (Ind. CL App. 1980) (rejecting a
§ 2-318 claim by the purchaser's mother); Williams v. Fulmer, 695 S.W.2d 411 (Ky.
1985) (rejecting a § 2-318 claim by the purchaser's wife); Johnson v. General Motors
Corp., 502 A.2d 1317 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (rejecting a § 2-318 claim by the
purchaser's wife).
17. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 59 (I. App. Ct. 1987);
Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 199 A.2d 463 (Pa. 1964); Eisenmann v. Cantor Bros., 567
F. Supp. 1347 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
18. See, e.g., Cowens v. Siemens-Elema AB, 837 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying
Missouri law); Armijo v. Ed Black's Chevrolet Ctr., Inc., 733 P.2d 870 (N.M. Ct. App.
1987); Fisher v. Graco, Inc., 440 N.Y.S.2d 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
19. See, e.g., Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973)
(passenger injured in an auto accident sued manufacturer of the other vehicle for
breach-of-warranty).
20. See, e.g., Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 500 N.E.2d 557 (111.App. CL 1986),
overruled in part on other grounds, Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591
(IlL App. Ct. 1987); Moss v. Polyco, 522 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1974).
21. See, e.g., Pack & Process, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 503 A.2d 646 (DeL Super. CL
1985); Groppel Co., v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. CL App. 1981);
Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (NJ. 1985).
22. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 466 N.E.2d 1040 (m. App. CL 1984);
Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 326 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974);
Hardesty v. Andro Corp., 555 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1976).
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In this area of products-liability law, the plaintiffs' injuries vary from

personal inuryl to property damage' to economic loss.' Economic
loss can be "direct" or "consequential."' The courts have traditionally

been most sympathetic toward personal injury claims.' As a result, the
courts often permit nonprivity plaintiffs to use implied warranty claims
to recover for personal injury, but not for economic loss or property
damage.' On the other hand, some jurisdictions do permit nonprivity
plaintiffs to use implied warranty actions to recover for economic loss
or property damage.'M Other states permit nonprivity plaintiffs to

23. See, e.g., Steckal v. Haughton Elevator Co., 449 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1983); Tirino
v. Kenner Prod. Co., 341 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973); Hargrove v. Newsome, 470
S.W.2d 348 (Tenn. 1971), cerL denied, 405 U.S. 907 (1972).
24. See, e.g., Wear v. Chenault Motor Co., 293 So. 2d 298 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974);
Pack & Process, 503 A.2d 646; Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 244 N.W.2d 105
(Minn. 1976); Monsanto Co., 326 A.2d 90. Property damage involves physical harm to
the plaintiffs personal property. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 462.
25. See, e.g., Spiegel, 466 N.E.2d 1040; Groppel, 616 S.W.2d 49; Spring Motors, 489

A.2d 660. As Professors White and Summers explain: "[an) action brought to recover
for inadequate value, costs of repair, and replacement of defective goods is one for
'economic loss' ....
Of course borderline cases do arise that do not fit comfortably
in either the property damage or economic loss category. "WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra
note 3, at 462.
26. The distinction between "direct" economic loss and "consequential" economic
loss is that:
"Direct" economic loss ...
includes ordinary loss of bargain damages: the
difference between the actual value of the goods accepted and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted. Courts will also frequently
measure direct economic loss by the purchaser's cost of replacement or cost
of repair. "Consequential economic loss," on the other hand, encompasses all
economic harm a purchaser suffers beyond direct economic loss as defined
above. Thus, consequential economic loss includes loss of profits resulting
from the failure of goods to function as warranted, loss of goodwill and loss
of business reputation.
WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 463.
27. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
28. See, e.g., Chastain v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 275 S.E.2d 679 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980);
Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 1008 (Mass. 1982); Westlake v. Big Town
Supermart, Inc., No. 49809, 1985 WL 3982 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1985). See generally WHrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 456-62.
29. See, e.g., Gross v. Systems Eng'g Corp., 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 42
(E.D. Pa. 1983); Rothe v. Maloney Cadillac, Inc., 518 N.E.2d 1028 (11L1988); Szajna v.
General Motors Corp., 503 N.E.2d 760 (M. 1986); Bagel v. America Honda Motor Co.,
477 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. App. CL 1985); Dutton v. International
Harvester Co., 504 N.E.2d 313 (Ind. CL App. 1987).
30. See, e.g., Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 633 P.2d 383 (Ariz. 1981); Spiegel v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 466 N.E.2d 1040 (I. App. CL 1984); Groppel Co. v. United States
Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. CL App. 1981); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at
464.
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recover for direct economic loss but not for consequential economic
loss.3' To complicate matters further, the defendants in these products

liability actions can be direct sellers' or remote sellers,' depending
upon their position in the chain of distribution. Some courts hold that
implied warranty actions cannot be maintained against remote sellers

when economic loss is the only injury that the plaintiff has sustained; '
other courts reach just the opposite conclusion.'

The most common defense that section 2-318 plaintiffs encounter is
the lack-of-privity defense.' Other defenses may be based on lack of

notice,' warranty disclaimers,' remedy limitations,' and the statute
of limitations.' The drafters seemed to have envisioned that some of

31. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 466.
32. See, e.g., Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 309 N.E.2d 550 (1ll. 1974); Szrama v.
Alumo Prods. Co., 462 N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); Singer v. Federated Dept.
Stores, Inc. 447 N.Y.S.2d 582 (N.Y. 1981); Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870
(OkI. 1979). The term "direct" seller is discussed infra part H.D.
33. See, e.g., Gross, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 42; Pack & Process, Inc. v.
Celotex Corp., 503 A.2d 646 (DeL Super. Ct. 1985); Rothe, 518 N.E.2d 1028; Spiegel,
466 N.E.2d 1040; Prairie Prod., Inc. v. Agchem Div.-Pennwalt Corp., 514 N.E.2d 1299
(Ind. Ct App. 1987); Dutton, 504 N.E.2d 313; Spring Motors Distribs., Inc., 489 A.2d
660. The term "remote" seller is discussed infra part I.D. The distinction between remote sellers and direct sellers is clarified infra part U.D.
34. See, e.g., Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 276 A.2d 807 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1970); General Motors Corp. v. Halco Instruments, Inc., 185 S.E.2d 619 (Ga. Ct. App.
1971); Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 544 P.2d 306
(Idaho 1975).
35. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976); Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977); Western Equip. Co.,
v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1980).
36. The "lack-of-privity" defense is discussed infra parts l.D and IV.
37. For example, U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) provides that, after accepting goods, the
buyer's failure to notify the seller of a breach of contract "within a reasonable time
after [the buyer] discovers or should have discovered [the] breach" results in the
waiver of any remedies against the seller, including the right to sue for breach of
warranty. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1987). In addition, U.C.C. §§ 2-602(1) and 2-605(1)
contain other notice requirements. The Code's notice requirements are discussed infa
part II.F.
38. In this Article, the term "warranty disclaimer" is used broadly to refer to both
language that limits or modifies warranties and language that excludes or disclaims
warranties. For purposes of this Article, U.C.C. § 2-316 is the pertinent statute. The
topic of warranty disclaimers is discussed ir(fru part ILF.
39. U.C.C. §§ 1-102(3) and 2-719 permit contracting parties to supplement, modify,
limit, and exclude Code remedies. The topic of remedy limitations is discussed irtfa
part II.F.
40. U.C.C. § 2-725 provides in pertinent part that-
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these defenses would be effective in section 2-318 litigation."' However,
some cases suggest that the lack-of-notice defense is ineffective against
section 2-318 plaintiffs.' Other cases suggest that the courts are reluctant to permit defenses based on warranty disclaimers or remedy
limitations.' In addition, some courts have ruled that the tort statute
of limitations, rather than the Code statute of limitations, governs warranty claims filed pursuant to U.C.C. section 2-318."
These complexities make section 2-318 decisions seem confusing,
and, hence, some commentators complain that the case law under
section 2-318 is conflicting and confusing. This Article, however, will
focus upon identifying the general legal principles that explain and harmonize section 2-318 case law. The following are some general principles that this Article will extract from cases decided under section 2318, Alternative A.
(1) A nonpurchaser's warranty claim against a seller will be dismissed
for lack of privity unless:
(a) The plaintiff is a natural person in the purchaser's family or
household, or a houseguest who is suing to recover for personal injury, and the defendant is a direct seller,' or
(b) The plaintiff is an employee of the purchaser, is suing to recover for personal injury, and the claim is filed in a minority
jurisdiction where the courts have abolished the "horizontal"

An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within
four years after the cause of action has accrued .... A cause of action
accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of
knowledge of the breach. A breach-of-warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made ....
U.C.C. § 2-725 (1987). The Code statute of limitations defense is discussed infu part
ILF.
41. For example, Official Comment 1 to § 2-318 states, in pertinent part, "to the
extent that the contract of sale contains provisions under which warranties are excluded or modified, or remedies for breach 'are limited, such provisions are equally
operative against beneficiaries of warranties under this section." U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt.
1. See infm part ILF.
42. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 693 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Ga.
1988); Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 217 A.2d 71 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965); see also
WHrrE & SUMMERS, suprm note 3, at 481-83.
43. See, e.g., Patty Precision Prods. Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846 F.2d
1247 (10th Cir. 1988); Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981); Spagnol Enters., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 568 A.2d 948 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989).
44. See, e.g., Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 389 A.2d 1148 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1978) (clarifying the applicable limitations on a nonpurchaser's warranty claim), qffd,
424 A.2d 497 (Pa. 1981); Kelly v. Ford' Motor Co., 290 A.2d 607 (R.I. 1972).
45. See infra parts IV.A.1, IV.A.4, and IV.A.5.
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and "diagonal" privity bars to warranty claims by a
purchaser's employees;' or
(c) One of the traditional common law exceptions to the privity
requirement is available, such as the express warranty exception or the "intimate body product" exception.
(2) A purchaser's warranty claim against a remote seller to recover for
personal injury will be dismissed for lack of privity, unless:
(a) The claim is filed in a jurisdiction where the courts have abolished the vertical privity bar to personal injury claims; or
(b) One' of the traditional common law exceptions to the privity
bar is available.
(3) A purchaser's warranty claim against a remote seller to recover for
property damage or economic loss will be dismissed for lack of
privity, unless the claim is filed in a jurisdiction where the courts
have abolished the vertical privity bar to warranty claims for economic loss or property damage. 7
(4) There is conflict among the jurisdictions regarding the availability
of other Code defenses' based on notice requirements, warranty
disclaimers, remedy limitations, and the statute of limitations."
For example:
(a) Some jurisdictions reject the lack-of-notice defense in personal injury cases,' yet accept such a defense when the plaintiff is suing to recover for economic losses.5'
(b) Some jurisdictions reject defenses based on warranty disclaimers' or remedy limitations.'
(c) The jurisdictions are divided over whether the Code statute of
limitations or the tort statute of limitations applies to personal injury litigation under U.C.C. section 2-318.5
In considering the theories set forth in this Article, one must first
understand at least the basic law of warranty claims and defenses un-

46. See infra part IV2.
47. See ibfia parts IV.A.3 to IV.A.5.

48. See infra part II.F.
49. See infra part 1V.B.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See
See
See
See
See

infra
inf'ra
infra
infta
imra

part
part
part
part
part

IV.B.1.
IV.B.1.
IV.B.2.
IV.B.2.
IV.B.3.
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der the Code. Thus, the following section presents a brief discussion of

Code warranties and defenses, and section 2-318.
II.
A.

CODE WARRANTIES AND SECTION 2-318 DERrVATIVE ACTIONS

The Code Warrantiess

Code warranties can be divided into warranties of title and warranties of quality.' Warranties of quality can be subdivided into express
warranties and implied warranties. 7 Implied warranties can be further
divided into the implied warranty of merchantability and the implied
warranty of fitness for particular purpose.' Because a contract may include all three warranties," actions ified pursuant to section 2-318 frequently contain claims for breach of express warranty, breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of the implied warranty of fitness.
B. Express Warranties
Under the Code, an express warranty is typically created by something a seller says or does.' For example, an express warranty may
arise when a seller makes a promise to a buyer that relates to the
goods.6' Express warranties can also be created through a seller's description of the goods,' or when a seller displays a sample or a model

55. See generally Andrew M. Baker et al., Special Project, Article Two Warranties
in Commercial Transactions, 64 CORNEL L REv. 30 (1978); Deborah L Goetz et al.,
Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions:An Update, 72
CORNELL L REv. 1159 (1987).

56. See generally WHITE & SuMMERs, supra note 3, ch. 9.
57. See generally WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, chs. 9-2 to 9-10.
58. See generally WHrrE & SuMMERS, supra note 3, chs. 9-7 to 9-10.
59. U.C.C. § 2-315 cmt. 2 (1987). For example, shoes that a vendor advertises as
Swiss climbing boots might carry an express warranty that the shoes were made in
Switzerland, an implied warranty of merchantability and an implied warranty that the
shoes are fit for mountain climbing. The shoes might breach the express warranty if
they turn out to be made in Japan. They might breach the implied warranty of merchantability if they fall apart in two months under ordinary use. They might breach
the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose if they are unsuitable for mountain climbing, but not if they were unsuitable for jogging Id.
60. See generally WHrrE & SuMMERS, supra note 3, chs. 9-3 to 9-4.
61. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) provides: "Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation
or promise." U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (1987).
62. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(b) provides: "Any description of the goods which is made
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the description." Id. § 2-313(1)(b).
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of the goods.' Indeed, express warranties can arise even though a sell-

er never uses words like "warranty" or "guarantee."" However, a statement of opinion, a statement about the value of the goods, or a commendation of the goods usually will not create an express warranty.6
C.

Implied Warranties

Unlike express warranties, which are created by something that the
seller says or does, implied warranties arise automatically by operation
of law regardless of the seller's statements, conduct, or intentions, unless specifically excluded.'
1. The Implied Warranty of Merchantability' 7
Unless excluded by appropriate language, the implied warranty of
merchantability is automatically created by a sale of goods when the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." Most simply,
the implied warranty of merchantability is an implied promise that
goods will at least be of fair average quality and fit for their ordinary
purpose." Therefore, a new coffee maker that bursts into flames under

63. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(c) provides: "Any sample or model, which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the sample or modeL" Id. § 2-313(1)(c).
64. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) provides in pertinent part: "It is not necessary to the creation
of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as 'warrant' or
'guarantee' or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty." Id. § 2-313(2).
65. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) provides in pertinent part- "[A]n affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty." U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (1987).
66. U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comment 1, provides, in pertinent part- "Implied' warranties rest; so clearly on a common factual situation or set of conditions that no
particular language or action is necessary to evidence them and they will arise in
such a situation unless unmistakably negated." Id. § 2-313 cmt. 1. While Official Comments to the U.C.C. do not have the force of law, they are customarily regarded as
an authoritative aid in determining legislative intent. Interco Inc. v. Randustrial Corp.,
533 S.W.2d 257, 261, 262-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
67. For a discussion of the origins of the implied warranty of merchantability, see
William L Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L REv.
117 (1943).
68. U.C.C. § 2-314 provides, in pertinent part- "(1) Unless excluded or modified
(Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."
U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1987).
69. U.C.C. § 2-314 provides, in pertinent part-
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ordinary use is probably unmerchantable and the vendor may be liable
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.

2. The Implied Warranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose
The implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose is created

when, at the time of making the contract, the seller has reason to know
of any particular purpose for which the buyer requires the goods and
the seller knows that the buyer is relying on the expertise of the seller
to provide suitable goods." The implied warranty of fitness is an implied promise that the goods will be suitable for the buyer's particular
purpose, which may not be the normal or customary use of the

goods.7 1 "For example, shoes are generally used for the purpose of

(2)

Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used;
and
(d) nm, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(1) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316) other implied warranties
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.

Id, § 2-314(2), (3).
70. Id. § 2-315. This section provides as follows:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying
on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is
unless excluded or modified under [section 2-316] an implied warranty that
the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
Id. § 2-315.
71. U.C.C. § 2-315 cmt. 2. Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. Section 2-315 provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for which the goods
are used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to
the nature of his business whereas the ordinary purposes for which the
goods are used are those envisaged in the concept of merchantability and go
to uses which are customarily made of the goods in question.
Id, § 2-315 cmt. 2. The implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose is often simply called the "implied warranty of fitness." Accordingly, this Article refers to the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose as the "implied warranty of fitness."
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walking upon ordinary ground, but a seller may know that a particular
pair was selected to be used for climbing mountains. " ' If so, then the
sale of the shoes may carry an implied warranty that the shoes are fit
for mountain climbing. If the purchaser is subsequently injured during a
rock-climbing expedition because the shoes are unsuitable for mountain
climbing, then the seller may be liable in damages for breach of the
implied warranty of fitness.
D.

Defenses to Breach-of-Warranty Claims
1.

The Defense of Lack of Privity

The primary obstacle confronting plaintiffs is usually the defense of
lack of privity. Privity of contract is the connection or relationship that
exists between contracting parties.' When this relationship exists a
buyer and seller are said to be "in privity of contract," or simply "in
privity." Winterbottom v. Wright' is the first reported decision that
recognized lack of privity as a defense.' In Winterbottom, a mail-coach
driver sued a coach supplier to recover for the physical injuries he sustained when the mail coach tipped over.'m The coach company was
under contract with the Postmaster General to provide coaches for
carrying the mail.' Under the contract, the coach company was exclusively responsible for the maintenance and repair of the coaches." The
coachman was employed by another company whose contract with the
Postmaster General required it to provide horses and drivers to carry
the mail.' The coach driver and his employer had relied on the coach
company to keep the coach in a "fit, proper, safe, and secure state and
condition. " ' In his complaint, the coachman claimed that the coach
tipped over because the coach company had failed to fulfill its contrac-

72. Id.
73. See 4 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 778 (1951 & Supp. 1992); 8
SAMUEL WIU.IsTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 998A (3d ed. 1964 &

Supp. 1992).
74. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
75. See 1 FRED 0. HARRIS & ALPHONSE M. SQUILLANTE, WARRANTY LAW IN TORT AND
CONTRACT ACTIONS 337 (1989).

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Wintebottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 402-03.
Id. at 403.
Id.
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tual duty to maintain and repair the coach.8 In essence, the coachman
was suing the coach company for breach of contract, despite the fact
that he was not a party to the contract between the Postmaster General
and the coach company.' The court dismissed the complaint on the

grounds of lack of privity of contract, ruling that only the parties to the
contract could sue for breach of contract.'
There are two basic types of lack of privity: "vertical" lack of privity
and "horizontal" lack of privity.' The problem of vertical lack of privi-

ty arises when a purchaser files a breach-of-warranty action against a"

81. Id.
82. Id. at 404-05.
83. Id.
84. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 456. Corresponding to these two types
of lack of privity are two types of "non-privity plaintiffs: "vertical" non-privity plaintiffs and "horizontal" non-privity plaintiffs. Id. Occasionally the phrase "horizontal lack
of privity" is reserved for cases where a nonpurchaser sues a direct seller for breach
of warranty. The courts that use the term in that manner have coined the term "diagonal lack of privity" to refer to the situation where a nonpurchaser sues a remote
seller. See, e.g., HAw!UAIND, supra note 3, at 659. However, the courts usually do not
make such fine distinctions, although it might be helpful if they did. Generally, they
broadly use the term "horizontal lack of privity" to describe the privity problem that
occurs when a nonpurchaser is suing any vendor in the chain of distribution, regardless of whether the vendor is a direct seller or a remote seller. See, e.g., Whitaker v.
Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591 (III. App. Ct. 1987) (breach-of-warranty claim by
purchaser's employee against both direct and remote sellers); Salvador v. Atlantic
Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974) (same). To avoid confusion this Article will
follow the approach that the courts use. The term "horizontal lack of privity" is used
to describe the privity problem that occurs when a nonpurchaser is suing any vendor
in the chain of distribution, regardless of whether that vendor is a direct seller or a
remote seller. Whenever it seems important to distinguish the direct seller from the
remote seller, this Article will use the term "diagonal lack of privity" to refer to cases where a nonpurchaser sues a remote seller. The commentators occasionally refer
to a third type of privity problem called "diagonal" lack of privity. See, e.g., Peter A.
Donovan, Recent Development in Products Liability Litigation in New England,. The
Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 19 ME. L REv. 181, 217 (1967). Diagonal lack of privity occurs in
cases where a warranty action is instituted against a remote seller by a
nonpurchaser. Some of the personal injury cases discussed infra part IV.A.2 could be
used to illustrate the concept of diagonal lack of privity, although the courts treated
them as cases of horizontal lack of privity. In those cases warranty claims were filed
against manufacturers by nonpurchasers such as employees, invitees, and bystanders.
See, e.g., Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (dismissing suit brought by purchaser's employee against product manufacturer for breach
of warranty); Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (allowing suit by bystander against a product manufacturer for breach of warranty);
Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622 (Okla 1974) (affirming trial court's demurrer based
on limitations in suit by purchaser's invitee against manufacturer for breach of warranty); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974) (allowing suit
filed by purchaser's employee against manufacturer for breach of warranty).
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vendor in the distribution chain who is not the immediate seller.' For
example, the woman who buys a defective lawnmower from a department store and then sues the manufacturer is a vertical nonprivity
plaintiff." Thus, vertical non-privity plaintiffs are often referred to as
remote purchasers because they have not bought directly from the defendant seller. 7 Alternatively, the defendant sellers in vertical
lack-of-privity cases are often referred to as remote sellers because they
have not sold directly to the plaintiff purchasers.' The problem of horizontal lack of privity occurs when a nonpurchaser files a breach-ofwarranty action against a vendor in the chain of distribution.' The following are examples of horizontal privity- a man who was injured by
falling off a lawnmower sues the department store where his wife
bought the lawnmower or the company that manufactured the
lawnmower, or the employee who was injured by some heavy machinery sues the company that sold the equipment to her employer or the
company that manufactured the equipment. The point is that
lack-of-privity problems are basically disputes about whether various
nonprivity plaintiffs have standing to sue for breach of warranty.
The lack-of-privity defense can produce harsh results. For this reason, the defense has been undermined by developments in case law,'

85. See WITE & SUMMERs, supra note 3, at 456.
86. See id.
87. See id
88. See id
89. See id. The nonpurchaser may be someone who was injured while using the
product or someone who never actually used the product, but was nevertheless affected by it. Id. In other words, nonpurchasers can be users or non-users.
90. See McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913, 918 (Me. 1973). For example,
in step-by-step developments, the common law established exceptions to the privity
requirement for certain kinds of products: "[Flirst, drugs and articles of food and
drink (products of intimate internal bodily use) then, by analogical extension, toiletry
and cosmetic articles (products of intimate external bodily use), and, ultimately, ...
mechanical products in general." Id. As a result, the lack-of-privity defense was an
unreliable defense in common-law cases where personal injury was caused by food,
beverages, drugs, or cosmetics. See, e.g., Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 309 N.E.2d 550,
555-56 (Ill. 1974) (rejecting manufacturer's lack-of-privity defense to remote
purchaser's warranty action for recovery of personal irjury damages); La Hue v.
Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc. 314 P.2d 421, 422 (Wash. 1957) (rejecting manufacturer's lackof-privity defense to nonpurchaser's warranty action for recovery of personal injury
damages). By comparison, section 2-318 creates an across-the-board exception for all
types of products, but only certain types of plaintiffs have standing to sue under that
provision. See U.C.C. § 2-318; see also infra part ll.E. For a comprehensive state-bystate discussion of the common-law exceptions to the privity requirement, see R.D.
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1
the advent of strict liability in tort,"
and congressional legislation.'
Section 2-318 is an example of legislation that has weakened the vitality
of the privity requirement.'

E.

Analysis of U.C. C. Section 2-318

The purpose of section 2-318 is to give standing to certain non-privity
plaintiffs to sue as third-party beneficiaries of the warranties that a buyer received under a sales contract, "thereby freeing any such beneficiaries from any technical rules as to 'privity.'" The 1952 version of section 2-318 provided that the benefit of a warranty automatically extended to the buyer's family, household, and house guests.' However, this
early version of section 2-318 was opposed as a statute that reduced the
scope of warranty protection available to consumers by limiting the
class of third-party beneficiaries to the purchaser's family members,
household and houseguestsU As a result, some states refused to enact
this version of section 2-318, while the remaining states either adopted
nonuniform versions of the statute or proposed amendments to section
2-318.' The prospect of "further proliferation of separate variations in
state after state"' concerned the drafters because the purpose of the
Code is "to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.'
The drafters amended section 2-318 in an effort to stop the states from

Hursh, Annotation, Privity of Contract as Essential to Recovery in Action Based on
Theory Other Than Negligence, Against Manufacturer or Seller of Product Alleged to
Have Caused Injury, 75.A.LR.2d 39 (1961).
91. For a comprehensive history of strict liability in tort, see William L Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L REV. 791
(1966); William L Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE LJ. 1099 (1960).
92. See, e.g., the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1988) (permitting consumers to recover for
breach-of-warranty. despite the absence of privity between the consumer and the vendor). For an example of a case where a section 2-318 plaintiff added a MagnusonMoss Warranty Act claim, see Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 503 N.E.2d 760 (Ill.
1986). U.C.C. § 2-318, a legislative development that has diminished the vitality of the
lack-of-privity defense, is discussed infra part i.E.
93. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (1992).
94. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 2 (1992). For a comprehensive discussion of the various
types of section 2-318 plaintiffs, see Jane M. Draper, Annotation, Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Under UC.C. 2-318, 100 A.L.R.3d 743 (1990).
95. HAWKLAND, supra note 3, at 661. The 1952 version of section 2-318 was
identical to the current Alternative A to section 2-318. Id.
96. HAWIKAD, supra note 3, at 661-62.
97. HAWLAND, supra note 3, at 662-63.
98. HAWKLAND, supra note 3, at 663.
99. HAwKLAND, supra note 3, at 662 (quoting U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c)).
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adopting a variety of separate variations."n The amendment provided
three alternative versions of section 2-318, reflecting conservative, moderate, and liberal solutions to the problem of the proper scope of warranty protection to afford nonprivity plaintiffs under the Code. The 1952
version of section 2-318 became "Alternative A," and Alternatives B and
C were added.1 ' With the exceptions of California, Louisiana, and Texas, all of the states have adopted some version of section 2 -3 18 ."
The majority of states have adopted Alternative A."1 Alternative A
provides, in pertinent part, that:
[A] seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it
is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.'
M

Alternative A is the most conservative version of section 2-318 because it
limits the class of potential plaintiffs in four ways." . First, the statutory

100. HAWKLAND, supm note 3, at 663.
101. See HAWKLAND, supra note 3, at 663.
102. Texas has adopted a statute that leaves questions of horizontal and vertical
privity for the courts. California omitted section 2-318, but has enacted a separate
statute that is, in effect, similar to Alternative C. Louisiana has never enacted Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
103. Alternative A has been adopted in the following states: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See HAWLAND, supra note 3, at 666 n.1. Technically, the Florida
statute is a nonstandard version of Alternative A because it expands the class of
third-party beneficiaries to include the purchaser's employees. See HAWLAND, supra
note 2, at 649. In addition, the courts in a few states have judicially amended some
of Alternative A's restrictions. For example, the Illinois Court of Appeals and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court have expanded the class of third-party beneficiaries and
the class of potential defendants. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509
N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); and Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d
903 (Pa. 1974). These cases are discussed infr part IVA.K2.
104. U.C.C: § 2-318 (1992).
105. In principle, Alternative A limits the class of potential plaintiffs in a fifth way
because it contains a foreseeability requirement. In particular, the language of Alternative A confers standing only if it is "reasonable to expect that [the nonpurchaser]
may use, consume, or be affected by the goods." Id. In practice, however, the foreseeability requirement rarely, if ever, operates as a limitation upon the right to sue
for breach-of-warranty under Alternative A. See 4 ROBEirr ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318:10 (1983). For example, in Harris v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 23 Mass. App. Dec. 169 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1962), the purchaser's nine-year-old
son was Injured when the bottle of beer he was opening for his father broke. Re-
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language limits the class of potential plaintiffs to "natural persons." That
means that Alternative A is no help to partnerships and corporations
because they are not considered "natural persons."" Second, the statutory language limits the class of potential plaintiffs to the buyer's
houseguests, household, and family members.' Thus, Alternative A is
generally no help to the buyer's employees." Third, Alternative A is no

help to plaintiffs who have sustained only property damage or economic
loss because the statutory language requires personal injury." Fourth,
Alternative A does not grant standing to sue remote sellers because the
statutory language limits the class of potential defendants to direct sellers; however, the Official Comment to section 2-318 states that Alter-

versing a trial court judgment for the defendant, the court of appeals held that it
was reasonable to expect that a child would be affected by the bottle of beer and,
for that reason, the purchaser's son had standing to sue under Alternative A. Id. at
587. The state of Massachusetts later adopted a nonstandard version of Alternative C.
106. See, e.g., Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp. v. Crane Barge R-14, 476 F. Supp.
282 (D. Md. 1979); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Truck & Commerce Equip.
Co., 257 N.E.2d 380 (Ohio 1970) (corporation is not a "natural person" within the
meaning of § 2-318).
107. The term "family" in Alternative A has been liberally construed and is not
necessarily limited to the purchaser's nuclear family. See, e.g., Chastain v. Fuqua
Indus., Inc., 275 S.E.2d 679 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (purchaser's grandson, although not
dwelling in the same household as the purchaser); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 434
N.E.2d 1008 (Mass. 1982) (purchaser's niece, although apparently not dwelling in the
same household as the purchaser); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 376 N.E.2d 143 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1978) (same); Westlake v. Big Town Supermart, Inc., No. 49809, 1985 WL
3982 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1985) (wife of the purchaser's nephew, although apparently not dwelling in the same household as the purchaser); Browder v. Pettigrew,
541 S.W.2d 402 ('enn. 1976) (purchaser's mother-in-law).
108. See, e.g., Cowens v. Siemens-Elema AB, 837 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1988); Brendle
v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 505 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1974); Teel v. American Steel
Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337'(E.D. Mo. 1981); Parzini v. Center Chem. Co., 214 S.E.2d
700 (Ga. 1975); Weaver v. Ralston Motor Hotel, Inc., 218 S.E.2d 260 (Ga. Ct. App.
1975); Blankenship v. Morrison Mach. Co., 257 A.2d 430 (Md. Ct. App. 1969); Laclair
v. Silberline Mfg. Co., 393 N.E.2d 867 (Mass. 1979); Armijo v. Ed Black's Chevrolet
Ctr., Inc., 733 P.2d 870 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Fisher v. Graco, Inc., 440 N.Y.S.2d 380
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Dickey v. Lockport Prestress, Inc., 384 N.Y.S.2d 609 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1976); Lee v. Wright Tool & Forge Co., 356 N.E.2d 303 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975);
Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306 (Okia. 1975); Colvin v. FMC Corp., 604 P.2d 157
(Or. Ct. App. 1979); Hargrove v. Newsome, 470 S.W.2d 348 (Tenn. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 907 (1972).
109. See, e.g., Johnson'v. General Motors Corp., 502 A.2d 1317 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(purchaser's wife seeking to recover damages for a defective automobile transmission
did not have standing to sue under § 2-318); see also HAwKLAND, supra note 3, at
665.
110. Alternative A of § 2-318 uses the phrase "his buyer" (i.e., "A seller's warranty ...
extends to any natural person in the family or household of his buyer. .
U.C.C. § 2-318). The term "his buyer" has been interpreted to mean the sellers immediate buyer. See HAwKLAND, supra note 3, at 665.
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native A "Iis... not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case
law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells,
extend to other persons in the distributive chain."' That language has
been interpreted to mean that Alternative A leaves problems of vertical
privity to be resolved by the courts."' Many courts have partially or
wholly abolished the vertical privity requirement." Alternative B,"4 Alternative C,"" and various nonstandard versions"" of section 2-318 go

111. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (1992).
112. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976); Old
Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1979); Nobility
Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
113. See, e.g., Fullerton Aircraft Sales & Rentals, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 842
F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying Kansas law); Patty Precision v. Brown & Sharpe
Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying Oklahoma law); Hixon v. SherwinWilliams Co., 671 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying Illinois law); Plant Food Co-op
v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp., 633 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying Montana
law); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 612 F. Supp. 983 (D.D.C. 1985) (applying New Jersey.
law); County of Westchester v. General Motors Corp., 555 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Horizons, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 551 F. Supp. 771 (D.S.D. 1982); Shooshanian v.
Wagner, 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279
(Alaska 1976); Manheirn v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1967); Rothe v.
Maloney Cadillac, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 497 (IlI. App. Ct. 1986); Citizens Gas & Coke
Utility v. American Economy Ins. Co., 477 N.E.2d 329 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); State
Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Webber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1961); Cova v.
Harley Davidson Motor Co., 182 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970); Durfee' v. Rod
Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977); Groppel Co. v. United States
Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985); Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d
305 (NJ. 1965); Old Albany Estates, Ltd, 604 P.2d 849; Nobility Homes of Texas,
Inc., 557 S.W.2d 77; Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1968).
114. Alternative B provides that. "A seller's warranty whether express or implied
extends to any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or
be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section." U.C.C. § 2-318 (1992).
Alternative B has been adopted in the following states: Alabama, Kansas, Carolina,
Vermont, and the Virgin Islands. See HAWKLAND, supra note 3, at 673.
115. Alternative C provides that
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section with respect to injury of the person of an
individual to whom the warranty extends.
U.C.C. § 2-318 (1992) Alternative C has been adopted in the following states: Hawaii,
Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. See HAWKLAND,
supra note 3, at 675.
116. The following states have adopted "nonstandard" versions of § 2-318, or sepa-
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beyond Alternative A in eroding the lack of privity defense.
Alternative B provides that "any natural person who may reasonably
be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is

injured in person by breach of the warranty" may institute a breach-ofwarranty action against the seller."7 Alternative B is more generous
than Alternative A because it expands the class of potential plaintiffs and
also the class of potential defendants. For example, Alternative B poten-

tially encompasses nonpurchasers who are not in the buyer's family or
household, such as the buyer's employees and invitees. Indeed, it is conceivable that even bystanders might have standing to sue for breach of
warranty under Alternative B."' In addition, Alternative B implicitly

abolishes the requirement of vertical privity because the seller's warranty
is not limited to "his buyer.""' Thus, Alternative B expands the class of

rate statutes that are similar in effect to § 2-318: Arkansas (similar in effect to Alternative C); California (California never adopted section 2-318, but has a separate
statute that is similar in effect to Alternative C; however, California's statute also provides for treble damages and attorneys' fees); Colorado (similar in effect to Alternative C); Delaware (similar in effect to Alternative B, except that the personal injury
requirement has been abolished); Florida (similar in effect to Alternative A, except
that the beneficiary class specifically includes the purchaser's employees); Maine
(similar in effect to Alternative C); Maryland (similar in effect to Alternative B);
Massachusetts (similar in effect to Alternative C, but contains potentially significant
variations); Minnesota (similar in effect to Alternative C); Mississippi (Mississippi has
a separate statute, Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20, which abolishes the requirement of
privity "[i]n all causes of action for personal injury or property damage or economic
loss brought on account of negligence, strict liability or breach-of-warranty"); New
Hampshire (similar in effect to Alternative C); Rhode Island (similar in effect to
Alternative C); South Carolina (modified form of Alternative B); Texas (Texas' version
of 2-318 leaves matters of horizontal and vertical privity to the courts for their determination); and Virginia (see the following comments).
See HAWKLAND, supra note 3, at 642-76. Arkansas, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Virginia have similar statutes. See HAWKLAND, supra note 3, at 642-57.
The Arkansas statute reads as follows:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any
action brought against the manufacturer or seller to recover damages for
breach-of-warranty, express or implied, although the plaintiff did not purchase
the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably expect to use, consume or be affected by
the goods. The manufacturer or seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section.
ARY. CODE ANN. § 4-86-101 (Michie 1987).
117. See supra note 114.
118. See, e.g., Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970) (applying Vermont law);
Nacci v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 325 A.2d 617 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
119. Furthermore, the Code defines the terms "buyer and "seller" in a way that
does not restrict those terms to direct buyers and direct sellers. For example, U.C.C.
§ 2-103(1)(a) defines the term "buyer" as "a person who buys or contracts to buy
goods" and § 2-103(1)(d) defines the term "seller" as a person who sells or contracts
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potential defendants to include remote sellers m But Alternative B does
not help nonprivity plaintiffs who have sustained only property damage
or economic losses. The statutory language requires personal injury. Similarly, Alternative B is no help to partnerships and corporations because
the statute is limited to "natural persons."
Alternative C eliminates the lack-of-privity defense the most." It provides, in pertinent, part that: "A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the
warranty. 122 Like Alternative A, Alternative C grants standing to the
buyer's houseguests and to the buyer's family members and household.
Alternative C is even more generous, however, because it expands the
class of plaintiffs to potentially include other nonpurchasers like the
buyer's employees and invitees, and bystanders."
Like Alternative B, Alternative C eliminates the vertical privity requirement. However, Alternative C is more generous than Alternative B because it does not require personal injury. The statutory language simply
refers to "injury." Thus, plaintiffs sustaining only property damage or
economic loss may have standing to sue.'
Unlike Alternatives A and B, Alternative C is not limited to "natural
persons." The statutory language refers to "any person," which is defined
under the Code to include corporations, partnerships, and other types of
organizations.'
Hence, Alternative C permits both corporations and
partnerships to sue for breach of warranty.
F.

Defenses to Warranty Claims

As stated earlier, the most common defense that nonprivity plaintiffs
encounter is the lack-of-privity defense. Plaintiffs also encounter defens-

to sell goods." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a),(d) (1992).
120. See HAWKLAND, supra note 3, at 672-73.
121. WrmoT & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 463; HAWKLAND, supra note 3, at 674-75.
122. See supra note 115 for the full text of Alternative C.
123. See Draper, supra note 94, at §§ 5-6.
124. See, e.g., Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 244 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. 1976) (allowing purchaser's father to recover for residential property damage caused when
their Christmas tree caught fire).
125. The term "person" in Alternative C includes partnerships and corporations by
virtue of U.C.C. § 1-201(30) (which says that the word "person" includes an organization), and § 1-201(28) (which says that the word "organization" includes corporations,
partnerships, and other types of organizations).
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es based on lack of notice, warranty disclaimers, remedy limitations, and
the statute of limitations. In fact, the drafters seemed to contemplate that
these defenses would be available in section 2-318 litigation." However,
despite the drafters' intent,"n some cases suggest that defenses based
on lack of notice, warranty disclaimers, remedy limitations, and the statute of limitations are unavailable in litigation instituted under section 2318.1n Part V.B of this Article will analyze some of the conflicting cases in which these defenses are raised. In order to follow the discussion
in part V.B, one must understand the basic law of defenses to warranty
claims. The balance of this section will present a brief discussion of
some of those defenses.

126. For example, Official Comment 1 to § 2-318 states, in pertinent part, "To the
extent that the contract of sale contains provisions under which warranties are excluded or modified, or remedies for breach are limited, such provisions are equally
operative against beneficiaries of warranties under this section." U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt.
1. In addition, Official Comment 5 to § 2-607 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
Under this Article various beneficiaries are given rights for injuries sustained
by them because of the seller's breach-of-warranty. Such a beneficiary does
not fall within the reason of the present section in regard to discovery of defects and the giving of notice within a reasonable time after acceptance. ... However, the reason of this section does extend to requiring the
beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has occurred. What is said
above, with regard to the extended time for reasonable notification from the
lay consumer after the injury is also applicable here; but even a beneficiary
can be properly held to the use of good faith in notifying, once he has had
time to become aware of the legal situation.
U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 5 (1992). The Official Comments to the U.C.C. do not have the
force of the statutory language enacted by the legislature but are regarded as a permissible and persuasive aid in determining legislative intent. See, e.g., Interco Inc. v.
Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257, 261, 262-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
127. See supra note 126.
128. See, e.g., R & L Grain Co. v. Chicago Corp. E., 531 F. Supp. 201, 208-09 (N.D.
Ill. 1981) (a sellers warranty disclaimers are effective against third-party beneficiaries); Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 217 A.2d 71, 73-74 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965) (notice defense is inapplicable to a section 2-318 plaintiff); Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 194 S.E.2d 513, 515 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (notice defense is inapplicable
to a § 2-318 plaintiff); Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 305 N.E.2d 750, 753-54
(N.Y. 1973) (disclaimer ineffective against purchaser's employees). But see Wenner Petroleum Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. (USA), 748 P.2d 356, 357 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (seller's
warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations are effective against § 2-318 piaintiffs).
Some courts have ruled that the tort statute of limitations, rather than the breach of
warranty statute of limitations, governs § 2-318 claims. See, e.g., Salvador v. Atlantic
Steel Boiler Co., 389 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978), ofd., 424 A.2d 497 (Pa.
1981); Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 290 A.2d 607, 609-10 (R.I. 1972). See generaUy WHITE
AND SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 481-83.
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1. The Use of Warranty Disclaimers as a Defense
The Code gives sellers the right to modify or disclaim warranties by
appropriate language." If goods do not carry a warranty, there is obviously no legal basis for a breach-of-warranty action. However, in order to
be effective, warranty disclaimers"n must comply with certain Code requirements. For example, a written disclaimer of the implied warranty of

merchantability generally must mention the word "merchantability" and
must be conspicuous. Similarly, a disclaimer of the implied warranty of

fitness generally must be written and conspicuous. However, both implied warranties can be disclaimed by expressions like "as is." Consequently, a section 2-318 plaintiff who surmounts the lack-of-privity defense may conceivably face an equally troublesome warranty-disclaimer

defense.
2.

The Use of Remedy Limitations as a Defense

The Code permits sellers to use remedy limitations to limit their liabili-

129. For example, under § 2-316(1) seller retain a limited right to disclaim or modify express warranties. In addition, § 2-316(2) permits seller to exclude or modify
Implied warranties:
[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part
of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing
must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of
fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example,
that "Tere' are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the
face hereof."
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1992). Similarly, section 2-316(3) provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are
excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other language

which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclu(c)

sion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty;,
and...
an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of
dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.

Id, § 2-316(3) (1992). The terms "course of dealing," "usage of trade," and "course of
performance" are defined and explained in Code §§ 1-205 and 2-208.
130. In this Article, the term "warranty disclaimer" is used broadly to refer to language that limits or modifies warranty liability and also to language that disclaims or
negates the existence of warranties and thereby prevents the creation of warranties.
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ty for breach of warranty. This would constitute another potential obstacle to recovery in section 2-318 breach-of-warranty actions. As the
term suggests, remedy limitations protect the seller "by limiting the
buyer's remedies" for breach of warranty." However, a remedy limitation is ineffective unless it complies with certain Code requirements. For
example, section 2-719(1)(b) permits a .buyer to circumvent a remedy
limitation unless the parties have explicitly agreed that the remedy limitation is the buyer's sole and exclusive remedy, in which case it is the

plaintiff's only remedy." Section 2-719(2) permits the courts to strike a
remedy limitation in order to preserve a minimum adequate remedy for
breach of contract.' Specifically, if a remedy limitation operates to de-

131. For example, § 2-316(4) provides that "[rlemedies for breach-of-warranty can be
limited in accordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation
of damages and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719)."
Id. § 2-316(4).
Section 2-719 provides that(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and
of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter
the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of
the price or to repair and replacement or non-conforming goods or
parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is
expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation
or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury
to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable
but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
Id. § 2-719.
Furthermore, U.C.C. § 1-102 constitutes an additional limitation on the right to
limit remedies for breach-of-warranty. The pertinent portion of Section 1-102 provides
that
(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except
as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good
faith [U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 1-203 and 2-103(1)(b)], diligence, reasonableness
[U.C.C. § 1-204] and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by
agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by
which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
Id, § 1-103.
132. ld. § 2-719(1)(a).
133. See supra note 131.
134. U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (1992).
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prive the plaintiff of a minimum adequate remedy, the limitation may be
avoided.
Similarly, section 2-719(2) permits the courts to strike a remedy limitation "[w]here circumstances cause [it] to fail of its essential purpose."'
Section 2-719(3) provides that the exclusion or limitation of consequential damages for personal injury is prima facie unconscionable in the case
of consumer goods, but not where the loss is commercial. This may allow a consumer to avoid a remedy limitation that excludes or limits a
seller's liability for personal injury.
3. The Defense of Lack of Notice
Under the Code, a buyer's failure to notify the seller of a breach of
warranty (e.g., a defect in the goods) prior to acceptance may prevent
the buyer from relying upon the breach to justify rejection of the
goods ' or as a basis for a breach-of-warranty action.' After acceptance of the goods, section 2-607(3)(a) provides that the failure to notify
the seller of a breach of warranty may result in the waiver of the right to
sue for breach of warranty and any other remedies against the seller.'
Therefore, the plaintiffs failure to timely notify the seller of a breach of

135. The two most common situations are: (i)cases where the exclusive remedy is
the repair or replacement of defective products or parts and the seller fails to timely
repair or replace; and (ii) cases where the buyer's right to object to deficiencies is
so narrowly circumscribed as to preclude meaningful objections.
136. However, courts are more willing to sustain remedy limitations that exclude or
limit a seller's liability for commercial losses. This stance finds support in the plain
language of § 2-719(3). See supra note 131.
137. U.C.C. § 2-602(1) states that "[rejection of goods must be within a reasonable
time after their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller." U.C.C. § 2-602(1) (1992).
138. U.C.C. § 2-605(1) states:
The buyer's failure to state in connection with rejection a particular defect
which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection precludes him from relying
on the unstated defect to justify rejection or to establish breach (a) where
the seller could have cured it if stated seasonably; or (b))
between merchants
when the seller has after rejection made a request in writing for a full and
final written statement of all defects on which the buyer proposes to rely.
d. § 2-605(1).
139. Section 2-607(3)(a) states: "Where a tender has been accepted the buyer must
within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach
notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy." Id. § 2-607(3)(a).
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warranty could constitute a potential obstacle to recovery in

breach-of-warranty actions filed under section 2-318."4
4. The U.C.C. Statute of Limitations Defense
Under U.C.C. section 2-725, the Code's four-year statute of limitations
generally starts to run on the date that the goods are delivered. This is so
even if the aggrieved party is unaware of the breach at that time.""
Thus, the Code statute of limitations conceivably could expire before occurrence of the injury to a person not in privity (e.g., an employee of the
purchaser). Thus, the statute of limitations could deprive section 2-318
plaintiffs of their breach-of-warranty actions. If so, then the Code statute
of limitations could thwart the drafters' intention of providing a
breach-of-warranty action for section 2-318 plaintiffs. For this reason,
some courts have refused to apply the four-year Code statute of limitations to litigation under section 2-318.' However, other courts have ap-

140. Official Comment 5 to § 2-607 provides, in pertinent partSuch a beneficiary does not fall within the reason of the present section in
regard to discovery of defects and the giving of notice within a reasonable
time after acceptance, since he has nothing to do with acceptance. However,
the reason of this section does extend to requiring the beneficiary to notify
the seller that an injury has occurred.
Id. § 2-607 cmt 5. This language suggests that § 2-318 plaintiffs are required, at a
minimum, to give notice of injury as a precondition to maintaining a breach-of-warranty
action. On the other hand, § 2-607(3)(a) says that the "buyer" must notify the seller of
breach or be barred from any remedy;, and § 2-103(1)(a) says that the term "buyer"
means "a person who buys or contracts to buy goods." Id. § 2-607(3)(a), 2-103(1)(a).
This suggests that the § 2-607(3)(a) notice requirement may be inapplicable to
nonpurchasers such as § 2-318 plaintiffs. Even if § 2-31$ plaintiffs are required to give
notice to the seller, it is unclear whether they must give notice to a remote seller.
Section 2-103(1)(d) states that "Seller" means "a person who sells or contracts to sell
goods." Id. § 2-103(1)(d). Thus, the term "seller" is not defined with specific reference
to § 2-607(3)(a). As a result, the reference to "seller" in § 2-607(3)(a) could mean the
"direct" seller.
141. U.C.C. § 2-725 provides, in pertinent partAn action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within
A cause of action
four years after the cause of action has accrued ....
accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of
knowledge of the breach. A breach-of-warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made."
Id. § 2-725. There are some exceptions to the four-year limitations period. For example, U.C.C. § 2-725(1) permits the parties to shorten the statute of limitations to one
year (but they may not extend it). And § 2-725(2) provides that where "a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must
await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or
should have been discovered." Id. § 2-725(2).
142. See, e.g., Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 389 A.2d 1148 (Pa. Super. Ct.
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plied the Code statute of limitations.'4 Part IV.B.3 of this Article analyz-

es the conflicting case law in this area.
5.

The Use of Tort Claims to Avoid Code Defenses

The preceding Code defenses based on the privity requirement, the

notice requirement, warranty disclaimers, remedy limitations, and the
U.C.C. statute of limitations are generally unavailable in tort actions.'TM
This is one reason why section 2-318 plaintiffs frequently add negligence
claims" and strict liability claims" to their breach-of-warranty claims.
Strict tort liability evolved as a judicial response to perceived inadequacies in warnanty law regarding consumers who sustained physical injuries
from defective goods. 7 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. was a landmark case in the development of products liability law. In that case, a
consumer's action for personal injuries and property damage caused by
the negligent manufacture of an automobile was not precluded even

though there was a lack of privity between the automobile manufacturer

1978), Wtd, 424 A.2d 497 (Pa. 1981); Lee v. Wright Tool & Forge Co., 356 N.E.2d 303
(Ohio 1975); Bowling v. Ford Motor Co., 296 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Tenn. 1968); Parish

v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 235 N.W.2d 570 (Mich. 1975); Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
625 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981).
143. See, e.g., Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (NJ.
1985); Williams v. West Penn. Power Co., 467 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1983); Ribley v. Harsco
Corp., 394 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
144. See WHiTE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 460, 462; see also, William K Jones,
Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of Contract Over Tort,
44 U. MI M LREv. 731 (1990).
145. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 194 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1972); Williams v. Fulmer, 695 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1985); LaClair v. Silberline Mfg.
Co., 393 N.E.2d 867 (Mass. 1979); McCarthy v. Bristol Lab., Div. of Bristol-Myers Co.,
449 N.Y.S.2d 280 (N.Y. App. 1982); Singer v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 447 N.Y.S.2d
582 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Westlake v. Big Town Supermart Inc., No. 49809, 1985 WL
3982 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1985); Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870
(Okia. 1979).
146. See, e.g., Williams, 695 S.W.2d 411; Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 662 P.2d 646
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Spring Motors Distribs,. Inc., 489 A.2d 660; Doulman v. Sears
Roebuck and Co., 445 N.Y.S.2d 851 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Ciampichlni v. Ring Bros.,
339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973); McCarthy, 449 N.Y.S.2d 280; Westlake, No.
49809, 1985 WL 3982; Hargrove v. Newsome, 470 S.W.2d 348 (Tenn. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 907 (1972).
147. See generally William L Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L REV. 791
(1966); William L Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YLE LJ. 1099 (1960).
148. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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and the consumer.Y Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors"w abolished
privity as a defense to a personal injury action based on breach of the

implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. In Henningsen, the
plaintiff sued to recover for the damages she sustained when her
husband's defective automobile crashed, injuring her and damaging the
automobile. The Court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that
"under modem marketing conditions, when a manufacturer puts a new
automobile in the stream of trade and promotes its purchaser by the
public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such
accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser." 5' These early
cases paved the way for the doctrine of strict liability in tort.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc." is regarded as the case
that first articulated the doctrine of strict liability in tort."6 In that case,
the California Supreme Court recognized that many so-called "warranty
actions" were really tort actions because the courts had weakened or
eliminated the normal contract defenses based on lack of privity, lack of
notice, and warranty disclaimers.' As a result, the California Supreme
Court explicitly abandoned the fictional warranty action in favor of a
strict tort liability action, stating:
Although... strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or
implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment
of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is
not assumed by agreement but imposed by law... and the refusal to permit the
manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective prod-

ucts... make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract
warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort. Accordingly, rules defining and
governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability to those
injured by their defective products unless those rules also serve the purposes for
which such liability is imposed.'

The bases of strict tort liability claims and warranty claims are different. The elements of Code warranty claims are discussed supra in part
II.A through II.C. Compare the contrasting requirements of the cause of
action for strict products liability under the Restatement (Second) Torts,
Section 402A
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer. (1)
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
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Id.
161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
Id. at 84.
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
See 63 AM. Jun. 2d Products Liability § 528 (1984).
Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901.
Id. at 901.
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caused to the ultimate user or consumer or to his property, if (a) the seller is
engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any' contractual relation with the seller.'

In practice, strict liability claims and Code breach-of-warranty claims
are parallel remedies for personal injury and property damage. The warranty claims may be easier to prove because they do not require proof
that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Instead, the
plaintiff only has to show that the product did not to work the way it
was supposed to work Strict liability actions are not subject to the difficult Code defenses based on lack of privity, lack of notice, warranty disclaimers, remedy limitations, and the statute of limitations. Thus, when
such defenses complicate a breach-of-warranty action, a strict tort liability action may be feasible. On the other hand, a breach-of-warranty
action may be feasible when a personal injury plaintiff is unable to maintain a strict liability action-for example, when a jurisdiction does not
recognize the strict liability cause of action, or when the plaintiff cannot
satisfy the prerequisites for that cause of action.
III.

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

The class of nonprivity plaintiffs who have standing to sue for breach
of warranty gets wider or narrower depending upon which version of
section 2-318 is adopted.'57 This suggests that one should analyze cases
decided under Alternative A separately from those decided under Alternative B, and analyze cases decided under Alternative B separately from

156. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTis § 402A (1965).
157. For example, Alternative A of § 2-318 gives a breach-of-warranty action to a
comparatively narrow class of nonprivity plaintiffs: "any natural person who is in the
family or household of the buyer or who is a guest in [the buyer's] home . . . and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty." U.C.C. § 2-318 (1992). By contrast, in states that have enacted Alternative "B" or "C," or some non-standard version, § 2-318 gives a breach-of-warranty action to a comparatively broader class of
nonprivity plaintiffs. For example, Alternative B states that the seller's warranty extends to "any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or
be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty."
Id. Alternative "C" is even broader the "seller's warranty ... extends to any person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and
who is injured by breach of the warranty." Id.
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those decided under Alternative C, and so forth. Otherwise, one may engage in the frivolous exercise of comparing apples and oranges. Consequently, this Article will focus upon cases decided under Alternative A
and leave the analysis of cases decided under other versions of section 2318 to a forthcoming follow-up article.
As previously discussed, Alternative A is designed to abolish the horizontal privity bar for a limited class of nonpurchasers. As the statutory
analysis in part MI.E established, four factors" determine whether a
nonpurchaser is in the statutorily protected group of plaintiffs who have
standing to sue for breach of warranty." First, the nonpurchaser must
be a natural person. Second, the nonpurchaser must be in the
purchaser's family or household or a houseguest of the purchaser. Third,
the nonpurchaser must have sustained personal injury. Fourth, the defendant must be a direct seller.l" Therefore, in breach-of-warranty actions
decided under Alternative A, the lack-of-privity defense should fail when
these four factors or variables are all present. For the sake of analysis,
this proposition is formally stated as follows:
Hypothesis 1:
The courts will reject a lack of privity defense to a nonpurchaser's
warranty action if: (1) the plaintiff is a natural person, (2) in the
purchaser's family or household or a houseguest, (3) who is suing to
recover for personal injury, and (4) the defendant is a direct seller.
Hypothesis 1 simply operationalizes the statutory language. The corollaries of Hypothesis 1 are more interesting. For example, Hypothesis 1
implies that in warranty actions decided under Alternative A, the
lack-of-privity defense should prevail when the plaintiff is a
nonpurchaser who is not in the buyer's family, household or a houseguest; or when a nonprivity plaintiff is not a natural person; or when a
nonprivity plaintiff is not attempting to recover for personal injury (but
rather for economic losses or property damage); or when the defendant is not a direct seller. For clarity of analysis, these corollaries will
be stated in the form of four additional hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2:
The courts will dismiss a nonpurchaser's breach-of-warranty action on
the grounds of lack of privity if the plaintiff is not in the purchaser's
family or household or a houseguest.

158. As previously stated, the foreseeability requirement rarely, if ever, operates as

a limitation upon the right to sue for breach-of-warranty under Alternative A. See 1
ROBERT ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318:10 (1983).

159. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1992).
160. Id,
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Hypothesis 3:
The courts will dismiss a nonprivity plaintiff's breach-of-warranty action on the grounds of lack of privity if the plaintiff has not sustained
personal injury.
Hypothesis 4:
The courts will dismiss a nonprivity plaintiffs breach-of-warranty action, on the grounds of lack of privity, if the defendant is a not a direct
seller.
Hypothesis 5:
The courts will dismiss a nonprivity plaintiffs breach-of-warranty action on the grounds of lack of privity if the plaintiff is not a natural
person.
The results of the analysis of cases pertaining to the preceding hypotheses are presented infra part IV.A. The results of the analysis of cases
involving defenses based on the notice requirements, warranty disclaimers, remedy limitations, and the statute of limitations are presented
inftra part IV.B.
IV. RESEARCH RESULTS
A.

The Lack of Privity Defense
1. The Support for Hypothesis 1

The support for Hypothesis 1 is very strong. Recall that Hypothesis 1
says that the courts will reject a lack-of-privity defense to a
nonpurchaser's warranty claim when: (1) the plaintiff is a natural person,
(2) in the buyer's family or household or a houseguest, (3) who is suing
to recover for personal injury, and (4) the defendant is a direct seller. In
each of five cases where all four factors were present, the direct seller's
lack-of-privity defense failed,'"" and there is no case involving all four factors where the direct seller's lack-of-privity defense prevailed. Westlake v.

161. Chastain v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 275 S.E.2d 679 (Ga. CL App. 1980); Chaffin v.
Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 194 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); Wolfe v. Ford
Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 1008 (Mass. 1982); Westlake v. Big Town Supermart Inc., No.
49809, 1985 WL 3982 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1985); Miller v. Preitz, 221 A.2d 320
(Pa. 1966), overruled in part on other grounds by Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d

848 (Pa. 1968).
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?
Big Town Supermartl
and Miller v. Preitz" are illustrative of this
line of decisions. In Wesdake, the plaintiffs uncle purchased industrial
tape from the defendant Big Town Supermart and gave it to the plaintiff,
Westlake.'" The plaintiff and his wife claimed that the tape gave off toluene fumes when used," and that the plaintiffs wife sustained brain
damage and memory loss when she inhaled the fumes.' The plaintiffs
instituted an action for breach of express warranty and breach of implied
warranty against Big Town Supermart.'" The court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs were section 2-318 third-party beneficiaries of
Big Town's warranties to the purchaser and, as such, had standing to sue
Big Town for breach of warranty. 6
In Miller v. Preitz,the decedent's aunt purchased a vaporizer from the
defendant pharmacy." The vaporizer was made by the co-defendant,
Northern Electric Company.'7 The decedent was using the device at his
residence when it suddenly ejected boiling water and killed him. 7' The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that the decedent's estate had
standing to sue the pharmacy for breach of warranty under section 2318, but that the decedent's breach-of-warranty action against the manufacturer should be dismissed on grounds of lack of privity."
To summarize, the cases decided under Alternative A suggest that a
direct seller's lack-of-privity defense will fail when nonpurchaser plaintiffs are clearly within the statutorily protected group. In other words,
the courts have no difficulty interpreting and applying Alternative A
when the plaintiff is a natural person in the buyer's family or household
or a houseguest who is suing to recover for personal injury, and the defendant is a direct seller. But does the lack of privity defense prevail, in
accordance with Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5, when one or more of these
factors is absent?
T

2.

The Support for Hypothesis 2

There is strong support for Hypothesis 2. Recall that Hypothesis 2 says

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

No. 49809, 1985 WL 3982 (Ohio Ct App. Nov. 27, 1985).
221 A.2d 320.
WesUake, No. 49809 1985 WL 3982 at *7.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.

168. Id. at *7.
169. Mil/er, 221 A.2d at 321-22.

170.
171.
172.
173.
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Id.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 324.
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that under Alternative A the lack of privity defense will prevail when the
plaintiff is a nonpurchaser who is not in the buyer's family or household
or the buyer's house guest. Crews v. W.A. Brown & Son, Inc.,7' supports this hypothesis. In Crews, the lack-of-privity defense prevailed
when a thirteen-year-old girl filed suit against the company that sold a
walk-in freezer to her church. 76 The plaintiff, who was working as a
volunteer at the church, sought to recover for the injuries she sustained
while she was trapped inside the freezer when the freezer door malfunctioned.T As a result of the accident, the plaintiff sustained severe frostbite to her feet, legs, and buttocks."= Her injuries were so severe that
she was hospitalized for two months and eventually lost nine of her
toes.'" Her complaint alleged breach of express warranty and breach of
implied warranty." The superior court entered summary judgment for
the seller, and the plaintiff appealed." The court of appeals affirmed
the lower court's judgment, holding that the plaintiff was not a member
of church's "family" or "household" (or its "houseguest") and, therefore,
lacked standing to maintain a breach-of-warranty action against the sell81
er.
Hypothesis 2 is also supported by Moss v. Polyco," Miller v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 83 and Steckal v. Haughton84 because the
lack-of-privity defense prevailed in each of those cases where the claimant was the purchaser's customer or invitee. For example, in Moss, the
plaintiff was injured in the restroom of the restaurant where she was din-

174. 416 S.E.2d 924 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
175. Id. at 927.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 929.
Id. at 926.
Id. at 930. See also First Nat'l Bank of Dwight v. Regent Sports Corp., 619 F.

Supp. 820 (N.D. IM. 1985) (hostess' social guest who was injured by a dart purchased

by hostess' mother was not a house guest of the purchaser for purposes of § 2-318);
Kramer v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 520 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1988) (airplane passenger lacked
standing to sue airplane manufacturer for breach of implied warranty); Curlee v.
Mock Enters., Inc., 327 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (guest on the boat of a handgun purchaser lacked standing to sue under § 2-318 to recover for personal injury
caused by allegedly defective handgun).

182. 522 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1974).
183. 500 N.E.2d 557 (I1. App. Ct. 1986), overruled in part on other grounds by
Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591 (111.App. Ct. 1987).
184. 449 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1983).
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ing. Her injuries occurred when a bottle of drain cleaner fell from a
shelf and spilled onto her.' The plaintiff sued the manufacturer and
the supplier of the drain cleaner for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, alleging that the defendants had defectively constructed
the container and its cap.' The state supreme court decided that the
plaintiff was not a section 2-318 third-party beneficiary of the defendants'
warranties and, consequently, lacked standing to sue for breach of war88
ranty.
Similarly, in Miller, the plaintiff was a customer of a transmission shop
who was waiting to get his car repaired." During the visit, a service
technician turned on an air compressor, which caused an explosion that
injured the plaintiff.'a The compressor was manufactured by Doerr
Electric Corporation and Melben Products Company, Inc., and sold to
the transmission shop by Sears Roebuck Company.'' The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Doerr, Melben, and Sears. The complaint included claims for breach of express warranty, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of the implied warranty of fitness." The circuit court dismissed the breach-of-warranty claims, and
the plaintiff appealed.' Affirming a lower court judgment, the appellate
court dismissed the warranty claims on the grounds that under Alternative A the plaintiff was not a section 2-318 third-party beneficiary and,
therefore, lacked standing to sue.'"
In Steckal, the plaintiff filed a breach-of-warranty action against an elevator manufacturer to recover for injuries sustained in an elevator accident that occurred while the plaintiff was a passenger in the elevator.
Affim-ing lower court judgments for the defendant, the court of appeals
decided that the plaintiff was not a section 2-318 third-party beneficiary
of the manufacturer's warranties and, therefore, lacked standing to
88
sue.
A number of other cases also support Hypothesis 2: Colvin v. FMC

185. Moss, 522 P.2d at 624.
186. Id.

187. Id.
188. Id. at 625.
189. Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 500 N.E.2d 557, 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), overruled in part on other grounds by Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591
(m. App. CL 1987).
190. Id.

191. Id.
192. Id. As is common in this type of litigation, the plaintiff also sought recovery
under theories of negligence and strict liability.

193. Id.
194. Id. at 559.
195. Steckal v. Haughton, 449 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1983).

196. Id. at 1265.
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Corp.; Dickey v. Lockport Prestress, Inc.; Weaver v. Ralston Motor
Hotel, Inc.; Hester v. Purex Corp.;" Hargrove v. Newsome; Lee
v. Wright Tool & Forge Co.;' Laclair v. Silberline Mfg. Co.;' Fisher
v. Graco Inc.;' Armijo v. Ed Black's Chevrolet Center, Inc.;' and
Cowens v. Siemens-Elema AB.' The lack of privity defense prevailed
in each of those Alternative A cases where the plaintiff was an "employee" who was injured by a defective product in the course of employment.' For example, in Hester, the plaintiffs injury was allegedly
caused by the use of a cleaning compound that the defendant sold to the
plaintiffs employer.' The plaintiff sued for breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. " The Oklahoma Supreme Court
dismissed the warranty claims because the plaintiff was not in the class
of section 2-318 third-party beneficiaries of the seller's warranties. 0
Similarly, Colvin was brought to recover for personal injuries the
plaintiff sustained in the factory where she worked."' The factory regularly used insecticides for insect control and the plaintiff claimed that
she had been injured by exposure to the insecticides." 2 The complaint
included a breach-of-warranty claim."3 The defendant was the company
that manufactured the insecticide and sold it to the factory where the

197.
198.
199.
200.

604
384
218
534

P.2d 157 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
N.Y.S.2d 609 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
S.E.2d 260 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
P.2d 1306 (Okia 1975).

201. 470 S.W.2d 348 (Tenn. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 907 (1972).
202. 356 N.E.2d 303 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (characterizing the cause of action as tort
because of lack. of contract privity -and thus dismissing case on statute of limitations
grounds).
203. 393 N.E.2d 867, 874 n.15 (Mass. 1979)(dicta noting "likely" privity problem).
204. 440 N.Y.S.2d 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (denying claim of plaintiff out of privity
because sale occurred before U.C.C. amendment permitting nonprivity actions).
205. 733 P.2d 870 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (truck driver not in privity with truck

seller).
206. 837 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Missouri law) (a purchaser's employee lacks statutory authority to sue for breach-of-warranty).
207. In addition, the dicta in other cases address Hypothesis 2. See, e.g., Boddie v.
Litton, 455 N.E.2d 142, 151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (rejecting liability because plaintiff was
employee of incidental beneficiary rather than contracting party).

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306 (Okla. 1975).
Id. at 1307.
Id. at 1308.
Colvin v. FMC Corp., 604 P.2d 157, 157-59 (Or. CL App. 1979).
Id
Id. at 159.
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plaintiff worked."' The plaintiffs complaint was dismissed on the
grounds of lack of privity."5
In Weaver, the plaintiff was involved in a traffic accident when his
truck broke down because of water contamination in the gasoline."'
The plaintiff subsequently sued the service station where he filled his
truck. 7 The complaint included claims for breach of express warranty,
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of the implied warranty of fitness."' The court of appeals held that the plaintiff
was not a section 2-318 third party beneficiary of the service station's
warranties to the plaintiffs employer and, consequently,
lacked standing
29
to sue the service station for breach of warranty.
Federal courts applying state law have generally ruled that
nonpurchasers such as employees, passengers, and bystanders lack
standing to sue for breach of warranty under Alternative .' For example, in LaGorga v. Kroger Co." the plaintiff was a small child who
survived burns covering eighty percent of his body.'m The injuries were
sustained when his jacket caught fire while he and two other children
were playing around a metal barrel in which trash was burning.' The
plaintiffs second cousin had purchased the jacket at the Kroger store
where she worked, and had given it to the plaintiff as a Christmas present.' The cousin was not in the plaintiffs nuclear family, did not live

214. Id. at 158.
215. Id. at 160-61.
216. Weaver v. Ralston Motor Hotel, Inc., 218 S.E.2d 260, 261 (Ga. Ct App. 1975).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 262.
220. See, e.g., Puckett v. Comet Mfg. Corp., 892 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curlam) (unpublished disposition; text available in WESTLAW) (applying Kentucky law);
Errichiello v. Eli Lilly & Co., 618 F. Supp. 484 (D. Mass. 1985); LaGorga v. Kroger
Co., 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 216 F.

Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1963). But see Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa.
1961) (applying Pennsylvania law) (in a confusing opinion, the district court in
Thompson rejected the lack-of-privity defense and ruled that an auto purchaser's

passenger could sue direct and remote sellers for breach-of-warranty to recover for
personal injuries sustained as a result of a defective accelerator pedal. Two years
later, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court restored the vitality of the
lack-of-privity defense in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 187 A.2d 575 (Pa. 1963). In
1974, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319
A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974), overruled Hochgertel, claiming that the Hochgertel decision had

become outdated. The court stated that although, at the time, Hochgertel was the
proper accommodation between tort and contracts law, Hochgertel became outdated
in light of the developments in products liability law. Salvador, 319 A.2d at 908).
221. 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
222. Id. at 377.
223. Id.

224. Id. at 375 n.7 and 377.
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near him, and did not even personally deliver the jacket to him.m Accordingly, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs breach-of-warranty
action against Kroger Company on the ground of lack of privity.'
In In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 7 a federal district court,
interpreting Illinois's version of section 2-318," held that the right to
recover for breach of warranty is limited to purchasers and the narrow
class of persons listed in section 2 -3 18 .' Since that section does not
mention the purchaser's employees, the court dismissed suits brought by
employees of ultimate purchasers for the seller's breach of implied warranties.' Similarly, in HemphiU v. Sayers," the federal district court
held that a college football player whose injuries were allegedly caused
by a defective football helmet could not sue the company that manufactured the team's helmets for breach of warranty.'m Other federal courts
have also indicated that a purchaser's employees lack a remedy under
Alternative A.'
The preceding cases suggest that courts apply Alternative A literally
and uphold the lack-of-privity defense when a plaintiff nonpurchaser is
not a member of the buyer's family or household or the buyer's houseguest. However, a minority line of authority to the contrary indicates that
the lack-of-privity defense fails despite the fact that the plaintiff
nonpurchaser is not in the buyer's family or household or the buyer's
houseguest.m As the following discussion will demonstrate, the expla-

225. Id.
226.
227.
228.
Hurd
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 376.
1981).
511 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ill.
Illinois has adopted Alternative A. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 810,
1993).
In re Johus-Manville, 511 F. Supp. at 1239-40.
Id.
552 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. 111.1982).

5/2-318 (Smith-

232. Id. at 694.
233. See, e.g., Vincent v. United Technologies Corp., 854 F.2d 1318 (4th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam) (unpublished disposition; text available in WESTLAW) (applying Connecticut law); Maynard v. General Elec. Co., 486 F.2d 538, 539 (4th Cir. 1973); Whitaker
v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010, 1017 (5th Cir. 1969, reh'g denied, 424 F.2d

549 (5th Cir. 1970); Hise v. John Does, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1026, 1028 (D. Idaho 1986)
(remanded for lack of diversity); Teel v. American Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337,
345 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Haragan v. Union Oil Co., 312 F. Supp. 1392, 1396 (D. Alaska

1970) (denying recovery to survivor of employee of independent contractor used by
buyer); Kimas v. International TeL & Tel. Corp., 297 F. Supp. 937, 938-40 (D.R.L
1969).
234. See, e.g., Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967) (dis-
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nation of this conflicting line of authority is that, in a few jurisdictions,
the courts have judicially abolished the privity bar to warranty claims by

nonpurchasers who fall outside the protected class of plaintiffs described
in section 2-318 (Alternative A).'
For example, the Illinois Court of Appeals and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reject the privity bar to warranty claims by a purchaser's
employees.' Whitaker v. Lian Feng Machine Co." illustrates their position. In Whitaker, the plaintiff sued to recover for personal injuries he
sustained while working with a bandsaw belonging to his employer,
DuPage Precision Products Company.' Lian Feng Machine Company
manufactured the bandsaw and sold it to an importer, who in turn resold
it to Valley Supply & Tool Company. Valley Supply sold it to DuPage.'

The plaintiff claimed the saw cut his left hand, amputating three fingers,' and alleged breach of the implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose." The circuit court granted the
defendants' motions to dismiss the breach-of-warranty counts for lack of

cussing Oklahoma law) (employee injured in stud-gun accident); Hoffman v. A. B.
Chance Co., 346 F. Supp. 991, 993 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (applying Pennsylvania law) (employee alleged injury in brake-lock malfunction; court predicts Pennsylvania would not
read § 2-318 to preclude strict liability); Hart v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 214 F.
Supp. 817, 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963) (employee sustains claim because privity extends to
successor in interest); Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591, 595 (111.
App. Ct. 1987),(purchaser's employee may sue for breach of warranty if employee
safety was implicit in the bargain); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d
903, 905 (Pa. 1974) (citing Hoffman and fulfilling its prediction); Ciampichini v. Ring
Bros., 339 N.Y.S.2d 716, 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (permitting an automobile passenger injured in a traffic accident to sue the manufacturer of the other vehicle for
breach of warranty). But see Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306 (Okia. 1975). The
Hester Court rejected the dicta in Speed Fastners and stated.
Our legislature, since 1966, has had several opportunities to adopt alternatives
B or C enlarging the coverage of the U.C.C. It has not chosen to do so.
Thus, until the Legislature elects to change this statute, we hold that the
U.C.C. section 2-318 does not extend the coverage of its implied warranty of'
merchantability to employees of the purchaser.
Id. at 1308. In this Article, cases that run contrary to any of the Hypotheses supra
part 1I.A are occasionally referred to as "nonconforming cases."
235. Occasionally, these case-law developments required overruling well-established
precedents. For example, in Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 908
(Pa. 1974), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly overruled Hochgertel v. Canada
Dry Corp., 187 A.2d 575 (Pa. 1963), a leading case dismissing warranty claims by a
purchaser's employees on the grounds of lack of privity.
236. See, e.g., Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d 59; Salvador, 319 A.2d 903.
237. 509 N.E.2d 591 (Ili. App. Ct. 1987).
238. Id. at 592.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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privity, and the employee appealed m The question before the appellate
court was whether an employee of the ultimate purchaser of a product
could recover for personal injury in a breach-of-warranty action against
any or all of the sellers in the chain of distribution.'

Although conceding arguendo that Illinois's section 2-3182u might not
present an obstacle to remote purchasers,'

the defendants argued that

the statute clearly delimited the class of nonpurchasers with standing to
sue for breach of warranty.' Since the plaintiff did not fall within the
class of persons listed in section 2-318, the defendants argued that the
plaintiff could not recover for breach of warranty."?
In interpreting Official Comment 3' to Code section 2-318, the
Whitaker court decided that "where the Comment speaks of 'developing
case law' it includes developing case law regarding persons in horizontal
privity with sellers."' The Whitaker court subsequently ruled that a

242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Illinois adopted Alternative A. The Illlnois statute provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his
home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this Section.
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 26, pare. 2-318 (1985), construed in Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 595 (ilL.
App. Ct. 1987).
245. In Berry v. G.D. Searle &: Co., 309 N.E.2d 550 (IUL1974), the Illinois Supreme
Court had previously abolished the vertical privity bar to Code breach-of-warranty actions for personal injury.
246. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 593.
247. Id.
248. Illinois adopted the text of the Official Comments to U.C.C. § 2-318. Official
Comment 3 to § 2-318 states in pertinent part:
The first alternative [Alternative A] . .. is not intended to enlarge or restrict
the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain. The second
alternative [Alternative B] is designed for states where the case law has already developed further and for those that desire to expand the class of
beneficiaries. The third alternative [Alternative C) goes further, following the
trend of modem decisions as indicated by Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A in
extending the rule beyond injuries to the person.
U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (1992) (citation omitted). ILL REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2-318
(1992); see also Witaker, 509 N.E.2d at 595.
249. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d.at 594. At least one commentator believes that commonlaw developments on the horizontal plane are contrary to the clear language of Alter1251

seller's warranty extends to an employee of the ultimate "purchaser who
is injured in the use of the goods, as long as the safety of that employee... was either explicitly or implicitly part of the basis of the bargain
when the employer purchased the goods. " MaThe facts in evidence convinced the court that the safety of the plaintiff was indeed part of the
basis of the bargain when the employer purchased the goods."1 Accordingly, the Whitaker court ruled that the plaintiff had standing to sue the
defendants for breach of warranty.'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co.' The plaintiff, Ahmed Salvador, lost
approximately seventy-seven percent of his hearing following as a result
of a steam-boiler explosion at his workplace.'s The plaintiff employee
filed suit against the company that sold the boiler to his employer and
the remote sellers who manufactured the boiler.m The complaint alleged breach of the implied warranty of fitness and also raised a tort
claim.' The trial court dismissed the breach-of-warranty claim on the
grounds of lack of privity, and the plaintiff appealed.27 The superior
court reversed and reinstated the breach-of-warranty claim.' The manufacturers appealed."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision to reinstate the warranty claim.=s Although noting that an employee was not one of the third-party beneficiaries to whom Alternative A
granted standing to sue, the state supreme court interpreted Official
Comment 3 to allow the courts to abolish the privity bar to
nonpurchasers other than the class of beneficiaries enumerated in Alternative A." The court subsequently held that a purchaser's employees

native A. See Alex Devience, Jr., The Developing Line Between Warranty and Tort
Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Does 2-318 Make A Difference?, 2
DEPAUL Bus. UJ. 295 (1990). For a discussion of the various judicial approaches to
this subject, see John F. Karnin, Note, The Extension of Implied Warranty Protection
to Employees of a Purchaser,14 S. ILL. U. LJ. 123 (1989).
250. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 595.
251. Id. Whitaker's employer purchased a bandsaw from Lian Feng Machine Co. The
court ruled, "Insofar as [the employer] bargained for a bandsaw that was as safe to
use as any merchantable bandsaw, it sought the safety on behalf of its employees
who were to use the saw." Id.

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
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Id.
319 A.2d 903, 904 (Pa. 1974).
Id. at 904.
Id,
Id. at 904 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 904-05.
Id. at 905.
Id.
Id. at 905-06. To justify this conclusion, the court pointed to language in Offl-
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have standing to sue the suppliers in the chain of distribution for breach
of warranty.'
The Salvador court's decision was influenced by the fact that other
jurisdictions had extended warranty protection to a purchaser's employees. For example, the court pointed out that "[tihe Supreme Court of Califoria... on analogous facts, held an employee to be part of the
employer's industrial 'family.'m

In addition, the court believed that public policy and legal symmetry
favored allowing a purchaser's employees to sue for breach of warranty
to recover for personal injury.tm The Salvador court summarized the
policy reasons for abolishing the privity requirement as follows:
First, the public interest in the protection of human life justifies the imposition
upon consumer products suppliers of full responsibility for harm resulting from

cial Comment 3, which states that "[Alternative A] is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law." Id. at 906 n.12.
262. Id. at 904.
263. Id. at 906 n.7 (citing Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 353 P.2d 575 (Cal. 1960);
accord Hart v. Goodyear Tre & Rubber Co., 214 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
264. In an earlier case, Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1968), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished the vertical privity bar. Id at 852. The question
presented in Salvador concerned whether the horizontal privity bar should also be
abolished. The court in Salvador decided that it should be. In reaching that result,
the Salvador court explicitly overruled one earlier decision, an established precedent,
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 187 AK2d 575 (Pa. 1963). In Hochgertel, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a purchaser's employee lacked standing to sue for
breach-of-warranty under Alternative A because employees were not in the statutorily
protected group. Id. at 577. In a later case, Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 199 A.2d 463
(Pa. 1964), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made an unconvincing effort to distinguish the Hochgertel decision. The plaintiff in Yentzer was a hotel manager who purchased four bottles of champagne on behalf of the hotel. Id. at 464. The manager
sustained serious injury after a cap from one of the champagne bottles unexpectedly
ejected and struck him in the eye. Id. The manager subsequently sued the bottling
company for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Id, The lower court
dismissed the complaint for lack of privity, on the authority of the Hochgertd decision. Id. 1he Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the manager had
standing to sue as a "purchaser" because he purchased the champagne. Id. at 464.
The court tried to distinguish HochgeteJ as a case involving a nonpurchaser. Id
However, the undisputed facts state that the Yentzer plaintiff bought the wine in the
course of employment on behalf of his employer for consumption by the hotel
guests. Salvador, 319 A.2d at 906. The hotel purchased the wine, and the plaintiff
was the purchaser's employee. As a result the Yentzer court's attempt to distinguish
Hochgertel is unconvincing. Yentzer should be viewed as a case where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court signaled a retreat from the Hochgertel decision. This retreat
culminated in the Salvador decision, which explicitly overruled Hochgertel. Id. at 908.
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use of the products. Second, as we have stated, the manufacturer by marketing
and advertising the product impliedly represents that it is safe for the intended
use and society should not allow him to avoid responsibility. Finally, multiplicity
of actions will be avoided by permitting a direct action by the injured party
against the manufacturer.=

As regards legal symmetry, the court stated that the concerns that
once made it reluctant to abolish the horizontal privity bar-the possibility that this might expose manufacturers to strict liability-was mooted

by the advent of strict liability.' The court further stated.
Today... a manufacturer by virtue of section 402A is effectively the guarantor of
his products' safety. Our courts have determined that a manufacturer by marketing and advertising his product impliedly represents that it is safe for its intended
use. We have decided that no current societal interest is served by permitting the
manufacturer to place a defective article in the stream of commerce and then to
avoid responsibility for damages caused by the defect. He may not preclude an
injured plaintiffs recovery by forcing him to prove negligence in the manufacturing process. Neither may the manufacturer defeat the claim by arguing that the
purchaser has no contractual relation to him Why then should the mere fact that
the injured party is not himself the purchaser deny recovery?
Because the manufacturer is now a guarantor, the "harsh and unjust result" is
worked on the plaintiff who may recover for his injury or loss if his complaint is
in trespass, but on identical facts would be denied relief if the pleading is captioned "Complaint in Assumpsit." This anomalous situation is certainly to be
avoided. Thus (w)ith Pennsylvania's adoption of Restatement 402, the same demands of legal symmetry which once supported privity now destroy it.'

Cases similar to Salvador involve public policy arguments broad

enough to apply to other types of nonpurchasers. For example, the public policy arguments used in the Salvador case to justify abolishing the
privity requirement for employees could be used to justify abolishing the
privity bar to claims by bystanders who suffer personal injury as a result
of a breach of warranty. Indeed, courts in other jurisdictions have abolished the privity requirement for bystanders on the basis of policy arguments reminiscent of those made in Salvador.'
In Ciampichini v. Ring Bros. Inc.,' the court held that a bystander
could maintain a breach-of-warranty action against a remote seller to
recover for personal ijuries.rs In that case, a traffic accident occurred
when the coupling hook attaching a trailer to a truck broke." The trailer became detached from the truck, crossed onto the wrong side of the

265. Salvador, 319 A.2d at 908 n.15 (citations omitted) (citing WaLIAM L PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Toms § 97 at 650-51 (4th ed. 1971).
266. Id. at 907-08 (citations omitted) (citing Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966)).
267. Id. (citations omitted).
268. See infra notes 269-281 and accompanying text
269. 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
270. Id. at 720.
271. Id. at 717.
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road, and collided with a car operated by Emilio Ciampichini, killing
him.'s The plaintiff, Frieda Ciampichini, a passenger in the car, susStained severe injuries. She subsequently sued Ring Brothers Corporation, the manufacturer of the coupling hook for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability.' Ciainpichini alleged that the trailer hook
was defective.'
The New York lower court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
the breach-of-warranty claim on the grounds of lack of privity.' The
New York Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Alternative A does not
prevent the courts from abolishing the horizontal privity bar to warranty
claims by nonpurchasers who are outside of the statutory class of thirdparty beneficiaries described in Alternative A. The Ciampichini court
explained thatThe Official Comment to Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-313 states that -Although
this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties made by the
seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which
have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or
to the direct parties to such a contract .... The provisions of Section 2-318 on
third party beneficiaries expressly recognize this case law development within one
particular area. Beyond that, the matter is left to the case law with the intention
that the policies of this Act may provide useful guidance in dealing with further
cases as they arise."'

Moving to the policy arguments that favor expanding Alternative A to
include "bystanders," the Ciampichinicourt pointed out
It is both reasonable and just to extend to bystanders the protection against a
defective manufactured article. To restrict recovery to those who are users is

272. Id,
273. Id.
274. Id. at 717-18.
275. Id,
276. Like the lower courts in the Salvador case, the lower courts in Ciampichini
were confronted with a decision of their supreme court that compelled dismissal of
the plaintiffs complaint on the grounds of lack of privity. The New York Supreme
Court had ruled in Berzon v. Don Allen Motors, Inc., 256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1965), that no action exists in favor of a non-user. Id. at 644. In Ciampichini,
the New York Supreme Court reconsidered Berzon and overruled it on the grounds
that it supported "a principle [the horizontal privity requirement] which we believe
outmoded and no longer adaptable to the rights of individuals in contemporary society." Ciampichini, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 717. Two years after the New York Supreme
Court's decision in Ciampichini, New York replaced Alternative A with a nonstandard version of Alternative B. See HAWKLAND, supra note 3, at 653-54.
277. Ciampichini, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 719-20.
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unrealistic in view of the fact that bystanders have less opportunity to detect any
defect than either purchasers or users. Our decision is one of policy but is mandated by both justice and common sense. We should not and do not hesitate to
extend the ambit of implied warranty to include bystanders.m

In addition, courts in other jurisdictions have also abolished the horizontal privity bar to warranty claims by nonpurchasers outside the statu-

tory class of third-party beneficiaries described in Alternative A.' The
usual beneficiaries of such common law developments are the
purchaser's employees;280 however, courts have protected other
nonpurchasers."

To summarize, the courts in a minority of jurisdictions have abolished
the horizontal privity bar to warranty actions by nonpurchasers outside

of the statutory class of third-party beneficiaries described in Alternative
A. This explains why the lack-of-privity defense occasionally fails in cases where the plaintiff is a nonpurchaser who is not in the statutorily

protected class described in Alternative A. An unanswered question is
why some courts find in the language of Alternative A the authority to

278. Id. at 720.
279. See, e.g., Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395, 398 (10th Cir. 1967)
(employee entitled to sue on theory of breach of implied warranty and not express
warranty); Hoffman Y. A. B. Chance Co., 346 F. Supp. 991, 993 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Hart
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 214 F. Supp. 817, 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963); Dippel v.
Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Wis. 1967) ("majority of jurisdictions... no longer adhere to the concept of no liability without privity of contract"). But see Hester v.
Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Okla. 1975) (rejecting as dicta the statements in
Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newson that section 2-318 grants standing to purchaser's
employees).
280. See, e.g., Hoffman, 346 F. Supp. 991 (applying Pennsylvania law). In Hoffman,
the employee suffered injuries when a brake failed and he was thrown from a mobile
platform. Id, at 992. The court refused to dismiss the complaint, reasoning that
section 2-318 would not prevent an employee from recovering for a product-related
injury. See also Hart, 214 F. Supp. 817; Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d
591 (I1. App. Ct. 1987) (court rejected remote seller's lack of privity defense, thus
giving the purchaser's injured employee standing to sue for breach-of-warranty);
Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974); Yentzer v. Taylon, 199
A.2d 463 (Pa. 1964); Speed Fastners, 382 F.2d 395 (discussing Oklahoma law). In
Speed Fastners, an employee filed suit for injuries suffered when a stud manufactured by defendant split and ricocheted. Id. at 396. The Court stated in dicta"We believe that the injured employee stands in the shoes of his employer
and that his cause of action based on implied warranty is not barred by the
shield of privity. The manufacturers know that most businesses are carried
on through employees who will actually use the product purchased by their
employers."
Id. at 398. But see Hester, 534 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
employees of purchaser may not claim breach of implied warranty of merchantability).
281. See, e.g., Ciampichini, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (protection extended to third persons
who are non-users falling in the path of harm).

1256

[Vol. 20: 1215, 1993]

U.C.C. Section 2-318 (Alternative A)
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

abolish the horizontal privity bar, when other courts interpret Alternative
A as a restriction that prohibits common-law developments in this area.
The answer to the question is that a crucial portion of Official Comment
3 to section 2-318 is ambiguous. The pertinent part of the comment reads
as follows:
This section [Alterative A] expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions
the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section in this
form is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law
on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other
persons in the distributive chain.'

Some courts interpret the first sentence of Official Comment 3 as an
exhaustive list of the nonpurchasers whom the drafters have freed from
the privily requirement. Courts that read the statute this way find in Alternative A an implicit restriction on case-law developments abolishing

horizontal privity and, therefore, decline to free those other types of
nonpurchasers from privity requirements.'
Other courts' focus on the first six words of the second sentence of

Official Comment 3 ("Beyond this, the section in this form is neutral.""), and find therein the authority to free other types of
nonpurchasers from privity requirements. In particular, the "additional
persons which [the] developing case law determines deserve the benefit

282. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt 3 (1992).
283. See, e.g., Cowens v. Siemens-Elema AB, 837 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying
Missouri law); Weaver v. Ralston Motor Hotel, Inc., 218 S.E.2d 260 (Ga. Ct. App.
1975); LaClair v. Silberline Mfg. Co., 393 N.E.2d 867 (Mass. 1979); Armijo v. Ed
Black's Chevrolet Ctr., Inc., v. Stuart Truck Equip., Inc., 733 P.2d 870 (N.M. Ct App.
1987); Fisher v. Graco, Inc., 440 N.Y.S.2d 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Dickey v.
Lockport Prestress, Inc., 384 N.Y.S.2d 609 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Lee v. Wright Tool &
Forge Co., 356 N.E.2d 303 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975); Hester, 534 P.2d 1306; Colvin v.
FMC Corp., 604 P.2d 157 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); Hargrove v. Newsome, 470 S.W.2d 348
(Tenn. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 907 (1978). In addition, some commentators have
expressed the view that common law developments abolishing horizontal privity run
counter to the clear language of Alternative A. See, e.g., Alex Devience, Jr., The
Developing Line Between Warranty and Tort Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Does 2-318 Make A Difference?, 2 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 295 (1990); John F.
Kamin, Note, The Extension Of Implied Warranty Protection To Employees Of A
Purchaser, 14 S. ILL. U. LJ. 123 '(1989). Professors White and Summers may belong
in this camp as well: "Some courts have taken Comment 3 to 2-318 to be a license
to exceed the limits of Alternative A's language on horizontal privity, and to provide
a cause of action to parties other than those specifically mentioned." WHt=E & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 460 n.8.
284. See, e.g., Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d 591; Salvador, 319 A.2d 903.
285. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (1992).
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of the purchaser's warranty. ' Viewed from this perspective, Official
Comment 3 establishes a minimum class of third-party beneficiaries but
does not restrict case-law developments in the areas of horizontal (or
vertical) privity.' This interpretation appears reasonable because the
word "this" in the second sentence of Alternative A clearly intends to
modify, the word "includes" in the first sentence. Furthermore, the Code
does not define the term "distributive chain,"' so it seems possible to

read the term "distributive chain" in Official Comment 3 ' as a reference to both purchasers and nonpurchasers in the chain of distribution.'m Indeed, this interpretation of the term "distributive chain" finds

support in Official Comment 2 to section 2-313, which states in pertinent
part:
[Tihe warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb
those lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be
confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract ....
The provisions of Section 2-318 on third party beneficiaries expressly recognize
this case law development within one particular area. Beyond that, the matter is
left to the case law with the intention that the policies of this Act may offer useful
guidance in dealing with further cases as they arise."'

Thus, some of the Code's Official Comments seem to authorize the
courts to extend warranty protection beyond the class of third-party
beneficiaries enumerated in section 2-318. It is understandable why the
courts that read the Code this way believe Alternative A gives them the
authority to wholly or partially abolish the horizontal privity bar.' Of
course, that does not explain how the courts decide whether any particu-

lar group of nonpurchasers deserves warranty protection.
In that connection, some courts have justified the decision to extend
warranty protection to the purchaser's employees by considering the

employees "functionally equivalent" to the purchaser's family members.m In fact, courts have referred to employees as the purchaser's

286. Walter K Swartzkopf, Note, Products Liability: Employees and the Uniform
Commercial Code, Section 2-318, 68 DIcx L REv. 444, 451 (1964).
287. Some commentators agree with the view that Official Comment 3 lacks any
implicit restriction that prevents the courts from abolishing the horizontal privity requirement. See, e.g., Swartzkopf, supra note 286, at 451.
288. U.C.C. § 2-103 (1992).
289. "Beyond this, the section in this form is neutral and is not intended to enlarge
or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his
buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain." U.C.C. § 2-318
cmt. 3 (1992) (emphasis added).
290. Indeed, the term is used this way in a leading case. See MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
291. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 2 (1992).
292. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 59 (11. App. Ct. 1987);
Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974).
293. See, e.g., Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Sys., Inc., 455 N.E.2d 142 (Ill. App. CL
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"industrial family."2" Indeed, similarities exist between the two groups.
For example, a purchaser's nuclear family and a purchaser's "industrial
family" both have a relationship to the purchaser. This fact makes it
easier to view both as intended beneficiaries for purposes of third-party
beneficiary doctrine, on the theory that the purchaser implicitly or explicitly bargains for their safety.'m Thus, the decision to grant standing
to the purchaser's employees and the purchaser's family members does
not necessarily compromise third-party beneficiary theory.m
On the basis of third-party beneficiary theory, however, one could
question the propriety of granting bystanders standing to sue under section 2-318. Unlike the purchaser's family members and employees, bystanders are generally "strangers" who have no familial or contractual
relationship to the purchaser or the seller.' This fact seems a potentially significant distinction for purposes of third-party beneficiary theory, making it difficult to view bystanders as intended beneficiaries. Furthermore, a purchaser's family members and employees are users, but
bystanders are usually non-users. This also seems a potentially significant
distinction for purposes of public policy, because users are obviously
foreseeable injury victims, but nonusers may or may not be. A seller
knows or has reason to know of users' harm if the seller's products are
defective, thus providing a rational basis for extending warranty protection to employees and family members. By contrast, the basis for extend-

1983); Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 399 N.E.2d 1355 (Il. App. Ct 1980), overruied
on other grounds, Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 491, 594 (Ill. App. CL

1987).
294. See, e.g., Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 353 P.2d 575, 581 (Cal. 1960).
295. Witaker, 509 N.E.2d at 595.
296. Despite the similarities, important differences exist between these two groups
of nonpurchasers. For example, they obtain their derivative warranty rights from different types of purchasers. Family members generally obtain their rights through a
consumer purchaser. By comparison, employees generally obtain their rights through a
commercial purchaser. Alternative A seems to envision that the buyer is a consumer
purchaser. This perhaps rests on the belief that commercial purchasers are more
likely to have bargaining power comparable to the vendors with whom they do
business. Thus, commercial purchasers remain in a better position to bargain for the
protection of their "industrial family' or to protect them through indemnity agreements with their vendors, insurance, and so forth. By comparison, consumer purchasers seem less well situated to protect their family members from injuries caused by
defective products. As a result, the policy considerations that favor extending warranty protection to a consumer purchaser's family members seem less applicable to a
commercial purchaser's "industrial family."
297. See, e.g., Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
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ing warranty protection to bystanders appears less certain. Of course, the
Ciampichini court had no trouble viewing bystanders as foreseeable
injury victims. Indeed, the court found support for this position in the
commentaries:
Such injury is often a perfectly foreseeable risk of the maker's enterprise, and the
considerations for imposing such risks on the maker without regard to his fault
do not stop with those who undertake to use the chattel. Such a restriction is only
the distorted shadow of a vanishing privity which is itself a reflection of the habit
of viewing the problem as a commercial one between traders, rather than as part
of the accident problem.'

Furthermore, the Ciampichini court argued that "[t]o restrict recovery
to those who are users is unrealistic in view of the fact that bystanders
have less opportunity to detect any defect than either purchasers or users. " M The court might also have argued that bystanders need statutory
protection even more than the purchaser's family members and employees because bystanders are completely outside the chain of distribution
and, therefore, probably have the least "leverage" over anyone in the
distribution chain. Yet, none of these arguments necessarily support an
extension of warranty protection to bystanders because they still have
tort remedies available.
To summarize, strong support exists for Hypothesis 2. Under Alternative A, the lack-of-privity defense usually prevails when the plaintiff
nonpurchaser is not in the purchaser's family, household, or a house
guest. However, in a number of cases the lack-of-privity defense fails
despite the fact that the nonpurchaser plaintiff is not in the buyer's family or household or the buyer's houseguest. The explanation for this is
that some courts have abolished the horizontal privity bar and extended
warranty protection beyond the class of third-party beneficiaries enumerated in Alternative A. The ambiguities present in Official Comment 3
have led courts to different conclusions concerning the propriety of this
type of case-law development. Some courts find in Official Comment 3
an implicit restriction on case-law developments abolishing horizontal
privity. Courts that interpret the Official Comment in that manner decline
to extend warranty protection beyond the class of beneficiaries enumerated in Alternative A. Other courts instead focus upon a different portion
of the Official Comment and find in Alternative A the authority to expand the statutorily protected class to include other nonpurchasers
whom the courts determine deserve warranty protection. If the drafters

298. Ciampichini, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 721 (quoting 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING
JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF ToRTS 1572 n.6 (1956)) (questioning why bystanders are prevented from recovering on a warranty theory).
299. Id.
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or the legislatures would clarify Official Comment 3, beneficial results
would follow.0
3.

The Support for Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 suggests that in breach-of-warranty actions instituted
under Alternative A, the lack-of-privity defense will prevail when a
nonprivity plaintiff sues to recover for property damage or economic
losses rather than personal injury. The following cases support the hypothesis: Mt. Holly Ski Area v. U.S. Elec. Motors;0 Ridge Co., Inc. v.
NCR Corp.;302 Gross v. Systems Engineering Corp.;303 Rothe v.
Maloney Cadillac, Inc.;' Szajna v. General Motors Corp.;' Bagel v.
American Honda Motor Co., Inc.;' Dutton v. InternationalHarvester
Co.;' Johnson v. General Motors Corp.;' and Prairie Production
Inc. v. Agchem Division-Pennwalt Corp." For example, Johnson v.
General Motors Corp."' was a case where the nonprivity plaintiff sued
to recover for property damage or economic losses. In Johnson, the
plaintiff's husband purchased a new car shortly before he died. The
plaintiffs widow subsequently experienced problems with the transmission and instituted an action against the auto manufacturer for breach of
express warranty and breach of implied warranty, in an unsuccessful
attempt to recover damages for the allegedly defective transmission.1 '

300. Some states have already taken steps in this direction. For example, Florida
has a nonstandard version of Alternative A that reads as follows:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer, who is a guest in his home
or who is an employee, servant or agent of his buyer if it is reasonable to
expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude nor limit the operation of this section.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.318 (West 1966 & Supp. 1993).
301. 666 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
302. 597 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
303. 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 42 (E.D. Pa. 1983).

304. 518 N.E.2d 1028 (Ill. 1988).
305. 503 N.E.2d 760 (Ill. 1986).
306. 477 N.E.2d 54 (11.App. Ct. 1985).

307. 504 N.E.2d 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
308. 502 A.2d 1317 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).

309. 514 N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
310. 502 A.2d 1317 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).

311. Id. at 1318.
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The court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it lacked privity,
ruling instead that the plaintiff was not a third-party beneficiary to the
defendant's warranties and therefore lacked standing to sue the defen-

dant for breach of warranty." '
Although the claimant was a nonprivity plaintiff in Johnson, the defendant was a remote seller. As a result, it is difficult to decide whether the
type of injury, i.e., property damage or economic loss, controlled the outcome of this case, in accordance with Hypothesis 3. Similarly, in other
property damage or economic loss cases, where the lack of privity defense prevailed, 13 the defendants were "remote" sellers. It is, thus, difficult for purposes of Hypothesis 3, to determine whether the type of injury controlled the outcome of those cases. It is clear, however, that the
lack-of-privity defense virtually always prevails when the nonprivity plaintiff has sustained only property damage or economic loss."4 By con-

312. Id. at 1318-19.
313. Mt. Holly Ski Area v. U.S. Elec. Motors, 666 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mich. 1987);
Ridge Co., v. NCR Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (buyer pursuing remote
seller for breach of implied warranty to recover for economic losses was barred by
lack of privity); Gross v. Sys. Eng'g Corp., 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 42 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (buyer pursuing remote seller for breach of implied warranty to recover for
economic losses is barred by lack of privity); Rothe v. Maloney Cadillac, Inc., 518
N.E.2d 1028 (Ill. 1988) (same); Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 503 N.E.2d 760 (1.
1986) (privity required to recover for economic losses on a breach of implied warranty claim); Bagel v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 477 N.E.2d 54 (Il. App. Ct.
1985) (privity required to recover for economic losses on a breach of implied warranty claim); Dutton v. International Harvester Co., 504 N.E.2d 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)
(buyer pursuing remote seller for breach of implied warranty to recover for economic
losses was barred by lack of privity); Prairie Prod., Inc. v. Agchem Div.-Pennwalt
Corp., 514. N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (buyer pursuing remote seller for breach
of implied warranty to recover for economic losses is barred by lack of privity).
314. The lack-of-privity defense failed in Milbank Mutual Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 244
N.W.2d 105 (Minn. 1976). In that case, the plaintiffs home was damaged when a
Christmas tree purchased by his daughter caught fire. The plaintiff homeowner eventually filed a breach-of-warranty action against the Christmas tree vendor. The district
court entered judgment in favor of the homeowner and the vendor appealed. The
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court and ruled that the homeowner
had standing to sue under section 2-318. Although the fire that triggered the lawsuit
occurred at a time when Minnesota was governed by Alternative A, by the time the
case came to trial Minnesota had adopted Alternative C. For various reasons, the
court applied Alternative C retroactively. Thus, Milbank can be distinguished as a
case decided under Alternative C. It is more difficult to explain the failure of the
lack-of-privity defense in Tamura, Inc. v. Sanyo Elec., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1065 (N.D.
Ill. 1986). The plaintiffs in Tamura were a restaurant named "Schino's" and an unrelated recording company next door named "Audio Mixers." Schino's restaurant purchased a tape deck that caught fire, damaging real and personal property in both
buildings. The plaintiffs filed suit against the tape deck manufacturers to recover the
losses. The complaints raised various theories of liability including breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability. The defendants moved to dismiss the warranty
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trast, it is easy to find cases where the lack-of-privity defense fails when
the defendant is a remote seller. 15 This suggests that the type of injury
may be controlling the outcome in cases involving both property damage
or economic loss and remote sellers. In other words, the lack-of-privity
defense may prevail in such cases because the plaintiff has sustained the
"wrong" type of injury. Nevertheless, the preceding decisions are all con-

sistent with Hypothesis 3 because in each case the nonprivity plaintiff
sustained only property damage or economic loss and in each case the
lack-of-privity defense was successful.
4.

The Support for Hypothesis 4

There is strong support for Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4 signifies that in
breach-of-warranty actions decided under Alternative A, the lack-of-privity defense will prevail when a nonprivity plaintiff is suing a remote seller
for breach of warranty. The following cases support this hypothesis:
Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co.;"' Miller v. Preitz;...
Westlake v. Big Town Supermart; 8 Chastain v. Fuqua Indust.; 9 Williams v. Fulmer,' Lane v. Barringer," McCarthy v. Bristol Labora-

claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked privity because Schino's' complaint
presented a vertical privity problem and nonpurchaser Audio Mixers' complaint presented a horizontal privity problem. In dicta, the court hinted that it could have rejected the vertical privity defense on the grounds that the direct seller was an
"agent" of the "remote" seller. Id. at 1070. The court actually rejected the lack-ofprivity defenses on the authority of Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 309 N.E.2d 550 (Ill.
1974). Tamura, 636 F. Supp. at 1070. However, Berry abolished the vertical privity
bar to warranty actions for personal injury and, therefore, provides no firm basis for
rejecting the lack-of-privity defense in a case where the plaintiffs sustained only
property damage, especially the horizontal nonprivity plaintiff Audio Mixers. Berry,
309 N.E.2d at 556. At least one commentator questions whether the Tamura case
was correctly decided. See John F. Kamin, Note, The Extension of Implied Warranty
Protection To Employees of a Purchaser (Whitaker v. Lian Feng Machine Co.), 14 S.
ILL. U. U. 123 (1989).
315. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591 (Il1App. Ct. 1987);
Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974); Ciampichini v. Ring
Bros., 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973). Each of these cases is discussed supra
part H.A.2.
316. 194 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972).
317. 221 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1976), (overruled in part on other grounds by Kassab v.
Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1968).
318. No. 49809, 1985 WL 3982 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1985).
319. 275 S.E.2d 679 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
320. 695 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1985).
321. 407 N.E.2d 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
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tories;n Thomaston v. Fort Wayne Pools, Inc.;'s and Anderson v.
Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co.O In each case, the defendant remote seller's lack-of-privity defense prevailed. Thus, these decisions support Hypothesis 4. Preitz, Westlake, Chastain, and Chqffin are interesting examples. Each involves two defendants: a direct seller and a remote
seller. Moreover, in each case the remote seller's lack-of-privity defense
prevailed and the direct seller's lack-of-privity defense failed. Chaffin is
typical.' Chaffin involved a personal injury action against a supermarket (direct seller) and a soft drink bottler (remote seller). The plaintiff's
daughter had purchased a soft drink from the supermarket's vending machine. 6 The plaintiff testified that a foreign "soapy-like" substance in
the soft drink made her sick 2 7 The plaintiffs complaint included a
claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.' The
court ruled that the plaintiff was a section 2-318 third-party beneficiary
of the supermarket's warranties to the purchaser, and therefore had
standing to sue that defendant for breach of implied warranty. However,
because the plaintiff was not a section 2-318 third-party beneficiary of
the bottling company's warranties, the plaintiff lacked standing to sue the
bottling company for breach of implied warranty.'
A contrary line of authority holds that the lack-of-privity defense fails
even though the defendant is a remote seller. For example, in Whitaker
v. Lian Feng Machine Co.,' and Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler
Co., a purchaser's employee sued a remote seller for breach of warranty and the remote seller's lack-of-privity defense failed. However, the
discussion supra in Part IV.A.2 explained that these cases were decided
in jurisdictions where the courts have judicially abolished the privity bar
to warranty claims in personal injury cases.' This is the typical explanation of the personal injury cases where the lack-of-privity defense fails

322. 449 N.Y.S.2d 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).

323. 352 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. Ct App. 1987).
324. 739 P.2d 1177 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
325. Choffin, 194 S.E.2d 513.
326. Id. at 518.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 514.
329. Id. at 515-16.
330. 509 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct 1987).
331. 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974).
332. As discussed supra part IV.A.2: 1) in Berry v. G.D. Searle, 309 N.E.2d 550 (ill.
1974), the Illinois Supreme Court abolished the vertical privity bar to warranty actions in personal injury cases, and 2) in Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848 (Pa.
1968), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished the vertical privity bar to warranty
actions for personal injury in that state. Part IV.A.2 also explains that the Whitaker
case and the Salvador case abolished the horizontal privity bar to warranty actions
for personal injury in Illinois and Pennsylvania respectively.
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even though the defendant is a remote seller. Other non-conforming cases' where a remote seller's lack-of-privity defense fails can be explained on the basis of well-established common-law exceptions to the
privity requirement.' For example, in some states lack-of-privity is not
a viable defense when an express warranty is breached." The express
warranty may arise from the defendant's advertising, product literature,
or product labels.' Of course, the plaintiff has to prove reliance on the
express warrant and that she is someone whom the defendant should reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the product.'
Cases like Tirino v. Kenner Products' fit comfortably within the express warranty exception.
5.

The Support for Hypothesis 5

There is less compelling support for Hypothesis 5. Recall that Hypothesis 5 asserts that in breach-of-warranty actions decided under Alternative
A, the lack-of-privity defense will prevail when the nonprivity plaintiff is
not a natural person. Cases such as Spiegel v. Sharp Electronics
Corp.,' Hardesty v. Andro Corp., O and Monsanto Co. v. Alden
Leeds. Inc.*" provide support for Hypothesis 5 because in each case the
nonprivity plaintiff was a corporation, and the lack-of-privity defense prevailed. However, the plaintiffs in these cases were suing to recover for
commercial losses and the defendants were remote sellers, and that

333. See, e.g., Tirino v. Kenner Prods., 341 N'Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973).
334. The "express warranty exception" is discussed later in this Article. There is
also a traditional common-law exception for "intimate body products." That exception
comes up in cases where personal injury is caused by the use of defective food,

beverages, drugs, or cosmetics. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 463. Thus,
such cases can be explained and distinguished on the basis of the "intimate body
product" exception. See, e.g., Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 662 P.2d 646 (N.M. Ct. App.
1983) (mammary prosthesis); Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870 (Okla. 1979)
(bottle of soda pop); Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 309 N.E.2d 550 (11. 1974) (oral
contraceptive). Section 2-318 changes prior case law by making an across-the-board
exception to the privity requirement for all types of products.
335. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at p. 467-68.

336. Id.
337. Id.
338. 341 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973). Alternatively, since the case involved a

cosmetic product, it is possible to explain and distinguish the decision on the basis
of the type of product that was involved.
339. 466 N.E.2d 1040 (i1. App. Ct. 1984).
340. 555 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1976).
341. 326 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974).
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makes it difficult to determine whether the plaintiffs status as a corporation controlled the outcome of these cases in accordance with Hypothesis 5. ' Furthermore, there is a contrary line of authority where the
lack-of-privity defense fails even though the nonprivity plaintiff is a corporation.
For example, in Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co.,3 plaintiff Spring Motors sued Ford Motor Company, a Ford dealer
known as Turnpike Ford Truck Sales, and Clark Equipment Company, a
company that manufactured and sold truck transmissions to Ford.'
Spring Motors was in vertical privity with both Ford and Turnpike but
was not in privity of contract with Clark because Spring Motors had not
purchased anything from that company.'
The transaction which triggered the lawsuit occurred when Spring Motors entered a contract to purchase 14 additional trucks from Turnpike
for the price of $265,029.00' The complaint alleged that the trucks had
defective transmissions and that Spring Motors had sustained economic
losses in the form of the costs of repair, towing, and replacement parts,
lost profits, and the diminished value of the trucks.' 1 The plaintiff
sought to recover for those losses on theories of breach of express and
implied 'warranty, strict liability, and negligence.' The trial court dismissed the tort claims on the grounds that the Code provided the
plaintiff's exclusive remedies for economic losses.'
The trial court also ruled that lack-of-privity barred the action between
Spring Motors and Clark and that the Code's four-year statute of limitations barred any action against Ford and Turnpike.-' Accordingly, the
trial court dismissed the complaint against all defendants." The appellate division affirmed the dismissal of the breach-of-warranty claim, but it
reinstated the strict liability claim by ruling that strict liability entitled a
commercial purchaser to recover for economic losses.'s On appeal, the
New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the Code provides a commercial

342. On the other hand, these cases provide support for Hypothesis 3 because the
corporate plaintiffs sought to recover for economic losses and the lack-of-privity
defense prevailed in accordance with Hypothesis 3. In addition, Spiegel and Hardesty
support Hypothesis 4 because the warranty claims were filed against "remote" sellers

and the lack-of-privity defense prevailed in accordance with Hypothesis 4.
343. 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985).
344. Id at 662.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 664.
348. Id,
349. Id.

350. Id. at 663.
351. Id.
352. Id.
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purchaser's exclusive remedies for economic loss, and that lack-of-privity
is not a defense to a breach-of-warranty action based on economic
loss.'
The supreme court's justification for restricting commercial buyers to
the Code remedies was that the Code provides a "more appropriate
framework" for resolving disputes between commercial entities than the
principles of strict liability.' The court explained that "tort principles,
such as negligence, are better suited for resolving claims involving unanticipated physical injury, particularly those arising out of an accident."'
The court also pointed out that the Code is a "comprehensive system for
determining the rights and duties of buyers and sellers with respect to
contracts for the sale of goods."' Additionally, the court noted that the
express purpose of the Code, as stated in section 1-102, is to "clarify and
make uniform throughout the United States the law governing commercial transactions." ' The court further stated:
Allowing Spring Motors to recover from Ford under tort principles would dislocate major provisions of the Code. For example, application of tort principles
would obviate the statutory requirement that a buyer give notice of a breach of
warranty [under Code Section 2-607(3)], and would deprive the seller of the ability
to exclude or limit its liability [under Section 2-316]. In sum, the U.C.C. represents
a comprehensive statutory scheme that satisfies the needs of the world of commerce, and courts should pause before extending judicial doctrines that might
TM
dislocate the legislative structure.

Acknowledging that its decision in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc. permitted a consumer to recover for economic losses on a strict
liability theory in an action against a remote seller, the Spring Motors
Court reiterated:
Insofar as indirect economic losses arising out of a commercial transaction between business entities are concerned, we believe that the U.C.C., not tort law,
provides the more appropriate analytical framework. By recognizing the supervening role of the U.C.C. in that context, we come closer to fulfilling the expectations
of the parties and the intent of the Legislature. The intended effect of our decision
is to satisfy the combined, if occasionally contending, goals of simplifying the law

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id. at 672, 674.
Id. at 676.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 665 (citing Ramirez v. Autosport, 440 A.2d 1345, 1349-52 (NJ. 1982)).
U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a)(1992).
Sprin9 Motors Distribs., Inc., 489 A.2d at 671.
207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
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pertaining to business transactions and providing a system of compensation that

responds to the needs of the commercial world.'

The court justified its decision to abolish the vertical privity requirement
and permit a commercial buyer to sue a remote seller by pointing out
that Alternative A is neutral, and the courts are allowed to determine
whether vertical privity should be required in a warranty action between
a buyer and a remote seller." The court then presented a variety of arguments favoring the abolition of the vertical privity bar.'
Courts in other jurisdictions have also abolished the vertical privity bar
and extended warranty protection to remote corporate purchasers.m
The decisions that permit such purchasers to sue for property damage or
economic loss are firmly rooted in the "case law" clause of Official Comment 3 to section 2-318.1 However, there is an interesting paradox involved in this line of cases. For example, in Spring Motors, the court
justified the decision to abolish the vertical privity requirement by pointing out that Alternative A is neutral and the courts are allowed to determine whether vertical privity should be required.' The court then offered a variety of policy arguments favoring the abolition of the vertical
privity bar.' However, earlier arguments favoring recognition of the supervening role of the Code undercut the Spring Motors court's reasoning.' In other words, after presenting a forceful argument favoring the
supervening role of the Code in commercial transaction, and disfavoring
"judicial doctrines that might dislocate the legislative structure,"'6 the
court reversed direction and tried to justify its decision to abolish the

360. Spning Motors Distribs., Inc., 489 A.2d at 675-76.

361. Id. at 675.
362. Id,
363. See, e.g., Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981) (holding that Alternative A is neutral on vertical privity; thus, the commercial purchaser is entitled to sue a remote seller on a breach-of-warranty theory to
recover for economic losses). The Groppel case is discussed irfra part IV.B.2.
364. "[Alternative A] ... is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case
law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to

other persons in the distributive chain." U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt 3 (1992) (emphasis
added).
365. Id.

366. Id at 674 (citing Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 342 A.2d 181, 185 (N.J.
1975); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 426 (N.J. 1972)).
367. Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 671 (N.J. 1985).

368. Id. at 675.
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Code's implicit privity requirement.'
paradox:

The court appeared aware of this

We conclude that the absence of privity between a remote supplier and an ultimate purchaser should not preclude the extension to the purchaser of the
supplier's warranties made to the manufacturer. We reach that conclusion notwithstanding our recognition that the Code generally applies to parties in privity... and that no privity exists between Spring Motors and ClarkY

6.

Summary and Conclusions: The Lack-of-Privity Defense

In summary, the following propositions emerge from the preceding
discussion regarding over-arching legal principles that explain case-law
developments concerning Alternative A of U.C.C. section 2-318:

(1) The courts will dismiss a nonpurchaser'swarranty claim against a
seller for lack of privity unless:

(a) The plaintiff is a natural person in the purchaser's family or
household, or a houseguest, is suing to recover for personal injury, and the defendant is a direct seller, or
(b) The plaintiff is an employee of the purchaser, is suing to recover for personal injury, and the claim is filed in a minority jurisdiction where the courts have abolished the horizontal or diagonal privity bars to warranty claims by a purchaser's employees; or
(c) One of the traditional common-law exceptions to the privity requirement is available (e.g., the express warranty exception or
the "intimate body product" exception).

369. The Code does not impose an explicit requirement of privity. See, e.g., John M.
Conley, Non-Contract Theories of Recovery Against Vendors of Defective Software,
230 PLI/Pat 473 (1986). However, the Code generally requires privity because the net
effect of the constant references to "buyer" and "seller" is to impose an implicit
requirement of privity. In addition, various Code provisions impose an implicit privity
requirement For example, the section 2-607(3)(a) notice requirement is triggered by
the buyer's acceptance of the "tender" of goods. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a). Section 2-503(1)
states that tender "requires that the seller put and hold conforming goods at the
buyer's disposition and give the buyer any notification reasonably necessary to enable
him to take delivery." Id. § 2-503(1). In addition, the discussion of "tender" in the
Official Comment to section 2-503 states that the term "contemplates an offer coupled
with a present ability to fulfill all the conditions resting on the tendering party and
must be followed by actual performance if the other party shows himself ready to
proceed" Id. § 2-503 cmt. 1. Hence, "tender" connotes a transaction between parties
who are in privity.
370. Spring Motors Distribs., Inc., 489 A.2d at 674 (citations omitted).
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(2) The courts will dismiss a purchaser'swarranty claim against a remote seller to recover for personal injury for lack of privity unless:
(a) The claim is filed in a jurisdiction where the courts have abolished the vertical privity bar to personal injury claims; or
(b) One of the traditional common-law exceptions to the privity
bar is available.
(3) The courts will dismiss a purchaser'swarranty claim for only property damage or economic loss against a remote seller for lack of
privity unless the claim is filed in a jurisdiction where the courts
have abolished the vertical privity bar to claims for economic loss
or property damage.
B. Defenses Based On Notice Requirements, Warranty Disclaimers,
Remedy Limitations, and the Statute of Limitations
As mentioned earlier, the Code provides a variety of potential defenses
to warranty claims including defenses based on warranty disclaimers,"
remedy limitations, notice requirements, and the statute of limitations.
There is no question that such defenses are potentially available against
direct purchasers because the pertinent Code statutes and Official Comments use terms such as "the buyer."m However, there is a question
whether such defenses are available in section 2-318 litigation because
the plaintiffs are not direct purchasers and may even be nonpurchasers.
However, the drafters seemed to envision that the defenses would be
available in section 2-318 litigation. For example, Official Comment 1 to
section 2-318 states in pertinent part: "To the extent that the contract of
sale contains provisions under which warranties are excluded or modified, or remedies for breach are limited, such provisions are equally operative against beneficiaries of warranties under this section."' Similarly,
section 2-607 is the source of a lack-of-notice defense, and Official Com-

371. In this Article, the term "warranty disclaimer" refers both to language that
limits or modifies warranty liability and to language that disclaims warranties.

372. For example, section 2-316(3)(a) states that sellers can disclaim all implied
warranties "by expressions like 'as is,' 'with all faults' or other language which in
common understanding call the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties." Id.
§ 2-316(3)(a) (emphasis added). Similarly, section 2-719, entitled "Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy," provides that "the agreement may ... limit or alter
the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's
remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of nonconforming goods or parts." Id. § 2-719()(a) (emphasis added). Furthermore, section 2-725 provides that "[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale
must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued .... A
cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's
lack of knowledge of the breach." Id. § 2-725(1), (2) (emphasis added).
373. Id. § 2-318 cmt. 1.
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ment 5 to section 2-607 states: "Under this Article various beneficiaries
are given rights for injuries sustained by them because of the seller's
breach of warranty. Such a beneficiary does not fall within the reason of
the present section in regard to discovery of defects and the giving of
notice within a reasonable time after acceptance, since he has nothing to
do with acceptance. However, the reason of this section does extend to
requiring the beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has occurred... even a beneficiary can be properly held to the use of good
faith in notifying, once he has had time to become aware of the legal
situation." ' Thus, the drafters seemed to contemplate that the Code's
defenses would be potentially available in warranty actions instituted
under section 2-318.
In addition, the courts have made policy arguments to the same effect.
For example, the Spring Motors court made a forceful argument for
judicial deference to the Code on the grounds that the Code is a "comprehensive system for determining the rights and duties of buyers and
sellers with respect to contracts for the sale of goods." m In this connection, the court cautioned against judicial implementation of decisions
that "would dislocate major provisions of the Code" like "the statutory
requirement that a buyer give notice of a breach of warranty," or the
seller's "ability to exclude or limit its liability." ' Thus, the Spring Motors court seemed to contemplate that the Code's defenses should be
available in section 2-318 litigation.
However, the court in Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co.' seemed
to reach the opposite conclusion. At one point in Salvador, the court
appeared to indicate that a section 2-318 personal injury claim is only a
tort claim:
V]irtually all jurists and scholarly commentators recognize that this [section 2-318
claim]... is purely a fiction created to reach a desirable social policy, the theory
of recovery sounds in tort .... If the theory sounds in tort rather than contract,
[then] it follows that the appropriate statute of limitations should be that which
would be applied if the plaintiffs complaint were captioned Trespass.'

At another point in the opinion, the court stated that "it takes a very
strained reading of section 2-725 to conclude that it was ever meant to

374. Id. § 2-607 cmt. 5.
375. Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 665 (N.J. 1985)

(citing Ramirez v. Autosport, 440 A.2d 1345, 1349-52 (NJ. 1982)).
376. Id. at 671.
377. 389 A.2d 1148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978), affd, 424 A.2d 497 (Pa. 1981).
378. Id at 1154 (citations omitted).
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apply to persons other than the contracting parties in breach-of-warranty
actions. "3T' In addition, the Salvador court pointed out that the courts
(not the legislatures) had expanded the statutorily protected class to
allow a purchaser's employees to sue for breach of warranty, and, therefore, "the remedy for such persons is entirely one of judicial creation.
That being the case, the courts should be free to choose and apply that
statute of limitations most likely to accommodate the purposes of extending Code protection to such persons." This type of reasoning
leads to the conclusion that the Code's defenses are unavailable in section 2-318 litigation. The following subsections of part IV.B of this Article
will examine some of the Alternative A cases that discuss the vitality of
Code defenses in section 2-318 litigation.'
1. The Lack-of-Notice Defense
Some cases suggest that the courts are reluctant to permit defendants
to use the lack-of-notice defense against an injured consumer,' even if
the plaintiff is a purchaser 8 3 and even if the plaintiff purchased the product directly from the defendant. 4 On the other hand, when the plaintiff
is suing to recover for economic losses, courts seem more willing to
permit the defense-at least when a defendant is a remote seller.'
In Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire,' the court held that a remote
seller's section 2-607(3)(a) lack-of-notice defense is ineffective against a
nonpurchaser suing for breach of warranty. 7 The plaintiff in that case
was the playmate of a child whose parents had purchased a bicycle from
a retail store.' The plaintiff sustained personal injuries as a result of
an alleged defect in the bicycle and subsequently brought a breach-ofwarranty action against the bicycle manufacturer. The manufacturer
raised the section 2-607(3)(a) lack-of-notice defense. Although noting that

379. Id. (citations omitted).

380. Id.
381. A follow-up article will expand the investigation to include jurisdictions that
have adopted other versions of section 2-318.
382. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 693 F. Supp. 1154, 1162 (N.D. Ga.
1988), offd, 893 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989); Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 378 N.E.2d
1083, 1087-88 (Il. App. Ct. 1978); Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 194
S.E.2d 513, 515 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 217 A.2d 71, 7374 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965). See also WHrr & SuMMERs, supra note 3, at 481-84.
383. See, e.g., Goldstein, 378 N.E.2d 1083.
384. See, e.g., Chqffin, 194 S.E.2d 513.
385. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
386. 217 A.2d 71 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965).
387. Id at 73-74.
388. Id. at 72.

389. Id.

1272

[VoL 20: 1215, 1993]

U.C.C. Section 2-318 (AlternativeA)
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

section 2-607(3)(a) does indeed give sellers a potential lack-of-notice
defense to warranty claims, the court decided that only immediate sellers
could take advantage of the defense.'e The practical result of this ruling
was that the manufacturer's lack-of-notice defense failed. Thus, the issue
was resolved and the court could have justified its decision on that basis.
The court, however, went on to say that section 2-607(3)(a) imposed the
notice obligation upon buyers and that the plaintiff in the Tomczuk case
was not a buyer, so the lack-of-notice defense failed for that reason
39
too.
The court in Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 2 also held that a remote seller's section 2-607(3)(a) lack-of-notice defense is ineffective
against a nonpurchaser suing for breach of implied warranty.' That
case was a products liability action instituted against a garment manufacturer on behalf of a three-year-old burn victim.' The little girl was seriously injured when the garment she was wearing caught fire while she
was playing with matches. The plaintiff's complaint rested on the theories of strict liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranty.' The
manufacturer raised the section 2-607(3)(a) lack-of-notice defense to the
warranty claim and moved for summary judgment.' However, the summary judgment motion failed because the district court ruled that
nonpurchasers are not required to give the section 2-607(3)(a) notice of
breach.9 The Court explained:
[B]y its terms the notice requirement [section 2-607(3)(a)] applies only to the
buyer and not to a third-party beneficiary such as the plaintiff. The official comment to section 2-607 of the Uniform Commercial Code apparently would impose
the notice requirement on third-party beneficiaries, but the authority in Georgia is

to the contrary.m

Similarly, Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co.' held that a direct seller's section 2-607(3)(a) lack-of-notice defense is ineffective
against a nonpurchaser suing for breach of implied warranty." In

390. A. at 73.
391. Id.
392. 693 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Ga. 1988).

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

Id, at 1162.
Id, at 1155.
Id. at 1156.
dL
Id. at 1161.
Id, at 1162.
194 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972).
Id. at 515.
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Chqffin, the plaintiffs daughter bought two bottles of Coca-Cola from a
supermarket vending machine while the two women were shopping."'
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff sustained personal injuries as a
result of consuming a foreign substance in the Coca-Cola.' The
plaintiff sued both the supermarket and the Coca-Cola bottling company
for breach of warranty. The breach-of-warranty claim against Coca-Cola
was dismissed on the grounds of lack of privity of contract, but section
2-318 (Alternative A) made it impossible for the supermarket to successfully raise the lack-of-privity defense.' Instead, the supermarket relied
on the lack-of-notice defense, arguing that the plaintiff could not sue for
breach of implied warranty due to failure to give notice of the breach as
required by section 2-607(3)(a). However, the court rejected the lack of
notice defense, stating:
These notice provisions of the breach cannot apply to plaintiff; a third party beneficiary, under U.C.C. § 2-318, for as to the third party there has been no tender of
the goods by the seller Big Apple [supermarket] and no acceptance by plaintiff.
She had nothing to do with the acceptance as she was not the buyer.'

In Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co.," the court held that a remote
seller's lack-of-notice defense is ineffective against a sub-purchaser who
gives notice to the immediate seller or the remote seller." The plaintiff
in that case had purchased an oral contraceptive at a drug store. Events
led her to believe that the contraceptive was defective, so she sued the
drug manufacturer for breach of implied warranty.' The defendant
manufacturer raised the section 2-607(3)(a) lack-of-notice defense on the
grounds that the plaintiff had not given notice of the injury to the remote
seller. The court rejected the defense, ruling that the notice requirement
applied to the purchaser's immediate seller rather than to a remote seller
such as the defendant."
The court reasoned that section 2-607(3)(a) requires a buyer to give
notice of breach to the seller "[wihere a tender has been accepted" and
that the term "tender" connotes a transaction between parties who are in
privity (e.g., the plaintiff and the drug store)." The court pointed to
various Code provisions and comments that supported this interpretation
of the word "tender" and subsequently decided that the use of the word

401. Id.
402. Id.

403. Id.
404. Id.
405. 378 N.E.2d 1083 (III. App. Ct. 1978).

406.
407.
408.
409.
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"tender" in section 2-607(3)(a) indicates that a buyer must give notice of
breach only to his immediate seller."'
However, other courts have decided that section 2-607(3)(a) requires a
purchaser to give timely notice to a remote seller."1 ' For example, Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc."' involved a married couple, the
plaintiffs, who purchased a defective mobile home from a retailer, Golden Heart Mobile Homes." The defendant, New Moon Homes, Inc., was
the manufacturer.'1' The vehicle was plagued by chronic problems. Failing to obtain any satisfactory response from the retailer or the manufacturer, the plaintiffs finally sought to return the vehicle to the retailer."5 Shortly thereafter, the retailer went out of business and the plain-

410. Id. Appellate courts in Texas and Kansas have reached the same conclusion.
See, e.g., Vintage Homes, Inc. v. Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886 (Te. Civ. App. 1979); Carson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 635 P.2d 1248 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). The Goldstein court
was confident that its ruling would not reduce the chances that remote sellers would
learn about defective products:
[Tihe Code envisions that when the consumer's notice of breach is given to
his immediate seller, such person to preserve any right of action he may
have for breach of implied warranty will give notice to his immediate seller,
and so on upstream until the seminal point of the distributive chain is
reached.
Goldstein, 378 N.E.2d at 1087.
Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 618 P.2d 657 (Colo. 1980), seems to justify the
Goldstein court's faith that remote sellers will receive notice through the chain of distribution. In Prutch, the court decided that direct notice from the consumer to the
manufacturer was not required because the consumer had given notice to his immediate seller, who in turn had notified the manufacturer. Id. at 660-61.

In addition, section 2-607(5) makes it likely that remote sellers will ultimately
receive notice through the chain of distribution. That statute provides, in pertinent partWhere the buyer is used for breach-of-warranty ...
for which his seller is
answerable over (a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation. If
the notice states that the seller may come in and defend and that if the seller does not do so he will be bound in any action against him by his buyer
by any determination of fact common to the two litigations, then unless the
seller after seasonable receipt of the notice does come in and defend he is
so bound.
U.C.C. § 2-607(5) (1992).
411. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976). In
addition, WHrrE AND SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 484, takes the position that notice to
a remote seller is required.
412. 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
413. Id. at 281.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 282.

1275

tiffs filed suit against the manufacturer."" The plaintiffs sought to recover for direct economic losses stemming from an alleged breach of the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for particular pur47
pose."
The superior court dismissed the breach-of-warranty claim on the
grounds that the plaintiffs were not in privity of contract with the remote
seller." 8 The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, ruling that a remote seller
can be held liable for direct economic loss attributable to a breach of its
implied warranties without regard to privity of contract between the
manufacturer and the ultimate purchaser."' The Court explained that
"by expanding warranty rights to redress this form of harm, we preserve... the well developed notion that the law of contract should control actions for purely economic losses and that the law of tort should
control actions for personal injuries.'
Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court justified the decision to abrogate the
vertical privity bar on the grounds that commercial disputes should be
resolved under the Code. Like the New Jersey Supreme Court in the
Spring Motors case, the Alaska Supreme Court understood that recognizing the pre-eminence of the Code in commercial transactions means
recognizing the seller's right to use warranty disclaimers, remedy limitations and other Code defenses to limit her liability for breach of warranty. In this regard, the court stated that
Our decision today preserves the statutory rights of the manufacturer to define his

potential liability to the ultimate consumer, by means of express disclaimers and
limitations, while protecting the legitimate expectation of the consumer that goods

distributed on a wide scale by the use of conduit retailers are fit for their intended use. The manufacturer's rights are not, of course, unfettered. Disclaimers and
limitations must comport with the relevant statutory prerequisites and cannot be
so oppressive as to be unconscionable within the meaning of [U.C.C. sections 2302 and 2-719(3)]. On the other hand, under the Code the consumer has a number
of responsibilities if he is to enoy the right of action we recognize today, not the
least of which is that he must give notice of the breach of warranty to the manufacturer pursuant to [U.C.C. section 2Mo07(3)(a)].

The warranty action brought under the Code must be brought within the statute of limitations period prescribed in [U.C.C. section 2-725. I

One discerns in this excerpt from the New Moon decision the notion
that a section 2-318 third-party beneficiary to a contract may not selectively enforce provisions of the contract, but is subject to the whole
contract. That same theme is reflected in other cases,' and also in the
416.
417.
418.
419.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 291.

420. Id.
421. Id. at 292 (footnote omitted).
422. See, e.g., R & L Grain Co. v. Chicago E. Corp., 531 F. Supp. 201, 209 (N.D. m.
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Official Comments to section 2-318.' Thus, the approach taken by the
Alaska Supreme Court in the New Moon case seems consistent with the
legislative history of section 2-318. However, the drafters would probably
agree with the views expressed in cases like Tomczuk, Morgan, and
Choffin that the Code defenses cannot be taken at face value in section
2-318 litigation. Indeed, Official Comment 5 to section 2-607 reflects that
viewpoint:
Under this Article various beneficiaries are given rights for injuries sustained by
them because of the seller's breach of warranty. Such a beneficiary does not fall
within the reason of the present section in regard to discovery of defects and the
giving of notice within a reasonable time after acceptance, since he has nothing to

do with acceptance.'

On the other hand, the drafters would disagree with Tomczuk, Morgan,
and Chaffin to the extent that the cases suggest that Code defenses
based on the notice requirement, warranty disclaimers, or remedy limitations are totally ineffective in section 2-318 litigation. Official Comment 5
to section 2-607 clearly demonstrates that the drafters contemplated that
the lack-of-notice defense would be available. For example, "[Tihe reason
of this section does extend to requiring the beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has occurred. [E]ven a beneficiary can be properly held
to the use of good faith in notifying, once he has had time to become
aware of the legal situation."' The Official Comments are generally regarded as a permissible and persuasive aid in determining legislative
intent.' Therefore, in cases like Tomczuk, Morgan, and Chaffin, the
courts may be ignoring the drafters' intent to preserve the vitality of
Code defenses in section 2-318 litigation. In Spring Motors, the New
Jersey Supreme Court cautioned the courts against taking stances that
might eviscerate Code defenses.'
It may be possible to read cases like Tomczuk, Morgan, and Chaffin in
a way that poses no threat to the integrity of the Code as a "carefully-

1989). The R & L Grain case is discussed more fully infra part IV.B.2.

423. Official Comment to section 2-318 states, in pertinent part, "To the extent that
the contract of sale contains provisions under which warranties are excluded or
modified, or remedies for breach are limited, such provisions are equally operative
against beneficiaries of warranties under this section." U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 1 (1992)

(emphasis added).
424. Id. § 2-607 cmt. 5.

425. Id,
426. Interco Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257, 261-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)

(quoting language from the Official Comments as evidence of the drafters' intent).
427. Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 674 (N.J. 1985).
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conceived system of rights and remedies to govern commercial transactions."" First, the Official Comment to section 2-607 does not indicate
whether notice must be given to remote sellers. Thus, it may be possible
to explain the failure of the lack-of-notice defense in cases like Tomczuk
and Morgan on the grounds that those cases involved defendants who
were remote sellers." Second, Tomczuk, Morgan, and Chuffin can be
viewed as cases where the courts decided that other important Code policies should take priority over the policies underlying the notice requirement. One commentary discerned the following policies underlying the
notice requirement:
The first and most important reason for requiring notice is to enable the seller to

make adjustments or replacements.or to suggest opportunities for cure to the end
of minimizing the buyer's loss and reducing the seller's own liability to the buyer .... The second policy behind the notice requirement is to afford the seller an
opportunity to arm himself for negotiation and litigation .... A final, and less
important policy behind the notice requirement is to give the defendant that same
kind of mind balm he gets from the statute of limitations. There is some value in
allowing a seller, at some point, to close his books on goods sold in the past and
to pass on to other things.'

These policies potentially conflict with the Code's implicit policy favoring
the protection of consumers against personal injury caused by a breach
of warranty. The consumer protection policy is arguably reflected in
U.C.C. sections 2-715(2)(b)"' and 2-719(3).' For example, section 2715(2)(b) expressly permits buyers to recover for personal injury or
property damage resulting from a breach of warranty. Furthermore, section 2-719(3) disfavors exculpatory contract clauses that limit or exclude
a seller's liability for personal injury. In effect, section 2-719(3) favors
personal injury claimants with a rebuttable presumption that such clauses are unconscionable and unenforceable. When the notice defense is
raised in personal injury litigation under section 2-318, the potentially
conflicting policies underlying the notice requirement in section 2607(3)(a) and other Code provisions such as sections 2-715(2)(b) and
2-719(3) are manifest. Thus, when courts reject the notice defense in sec-

428. Id. at 671.
429. Of course, one cannot explain on that basis the failure of the lack-of-notice defense in Chfin, where the defendant was a direct seller.
430. WHrE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 481.
431. U.C.C. section 2-715(2)(b) provides that "[clonsequential damages resulting from
the seller's breach includes injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach-of-warranty." U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (1992).

432. U.C.C. section 2-719(3) provides that "[c]onsequential damages may be limited
or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima
fade unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is
not." Id. § 2-719(3) (emphasis added).
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tion 2-318 litigation, they may be reconciling potentially conflicting Code
policies by favoring the consumer protection policy.
2.

Warranty Disclaimers and Remedy Limitations

There are cases that suggest courts are reluctant to permit defenses
based on warranty disclaimers or remedy limitations to be used against a
remote purchaser,' even when the plaintiff is a commercial purchaser' and when there have been significant commercial transactions between the remote purchaser and the defendant seller.' For example, in
Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co.,' a remote purchaser encountered the lack-of-privity defense and a defense based upon the

defendant's warranty disclaimer. In that case, the Missouri Court of Appeals perntted a commercial buyer, Groppel, to sue a remote seller, U.S.
Gypsum, for breach of warranty to recover for economic losses. The
court rejected Gypsum's lack-of-privity defense and ruled that the
defendant's implied warranty extended to remote purchasers like
Groppel.' Next, the court considered Gypsum's defense based on its
warranty disclaimer. Gypsum argued that the warranty disclaimer in the
contract between Gypsum and its immediate purchaser should be equally

effective against a remote purchaser like Groppel. However, the court
rejected this argument, stating:
The U.C.C. provides for the exclusion or modification of implied warranties in
[section 2-316]. This Code section is intended to ensure that the buyer is adequately apprised of the disclaimers and contemplates a contractual relationship between the two parties who are agreeing to limit the implied warranties. [section
2-3181, however, which extends implied warranty protection for personal injuries
to a class of persons not in privity with the seller, provides that the 'seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section.' Therefore, the ability to disclaim granted in [section 2-3161 is explicitly limited by [section 2-318]. Further-

433. See, e.g., Patty Precision Prods. Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846 F.2d
1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that numerical controls manufacturer's disclaimer
was not binding on ultimate buyer); Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616
S.W.2d 49, 60-61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that manufacturer's disclaimer in a
contract with a middleman does not apply to ultimate consumer); Spagnol Enters.,
Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 568 A.2d 948, 951 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that
ultimate purchaser of computer equipment could sue manufacturer even in the absence of privity).
434. See, e.g., Patty Precision Prods. Co., 846 F.2d 1247; Groppel Co., 616 S.W.2d
49; Spagnol Enters., Inc., 568 A.2d 948.
435. See, e.g., Spagnol Enters., Inc., 568 A.2d 948.
436. 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
437. Id. at 60-61.
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more, when an unreasonably dangerous product is marketed, the manufacturer's
and seller's ability to disclaim is totally eliminated because of the strict liability in
tort doctrine .... The foregoing illustrates that disclaimer power is not absolute.
And we hold that a manufacturer may not disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability to an ultimate consumer by merely including a disclaimer in a contract with a middleman or buyer who holds for resale only. To hold otherwise
would permit unfair circumvention of the manufacturer's duty,'
Similarly, in Patty Precision Products Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Co.,' the Tenth Circuit held that a manufacturer's warranty
disclaimers and remedy limitations were ineffective against a remote
purchaser." In that case, Patty Precision Products Company was appealing a district court order awarding General Electric attorney fees in
the amount of $170,421.54."' Patty Precision had been awarded a defense contract to manufacture bomb racks and subsequently entered into
a contract with Marusco Company to purchase Brown & Sharpe equipment capable of producing the bomb racks. 2 The machines were
equipped with numerical controls manufactured by General Electric.
Problems with the machines led Patty Precisions to sue the sellers. The
suit against General Electric alleged breach of implied warranty.' In
defense, General Electric pointed to the warranty disclaimers and remedy limitation clauses in its contract with Brown & Sharpe and argued
that those exculpatory clauses were also binding on a remote purchaser
like Patty Precisions.' However, the court ruled that General Electric's
disclaimers and remedy limitations had been disclosed only to Brown &
Sharpe and could not be considered effective against remote purchasers
like Patty Precision, which had purchased without notice of them.'
Similarly, in Spagnol Enterprises,Inc. v. Digital Equipment Corp.,'
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a remote purchaser was entitled to sue a computer manufacturer for breach of warranty to recover
for economic losses despite warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations
in the contract between the manufacturer and its immediate purchas-

438. Id. (footnotes omitted). The court pointed out that "[a] manufacturer still may
properly disclaim liability expressly to the consumer via prominent package markings
or otherwise in some manner calculated to give proper notice as contemplated by
section 2-316." Id. at 61 n.13. In addition, the court stated, "Our holding does not
restrict the right of a manufacturer and middleman to contract for indemnification. It
merely provides the consumer the option of suing the manufacturer directly in circumstances such as presented in this case." Id. at 61.
439. 846 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1988).
440. Id. at 1252-54.
441. Id. at 1247.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 1248.
444. Id. at 1248-51.
445. Id. at 1252.
446. 568 A.2d 948 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
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er."7 In Spagnol Enterprises, the plaintiff purchased computer equipment from a distributor who purchased the equipment from the manufacturer, Digital Equipment Corporation.' The plaintiff experienced problems with the equipment and continually placed service calls to Digital
Equipment. Eventually, Spagnol Enterprises sued Digital Equipment for
breach of warranty to recover for economic losses allegedly caused by
the defective computer equipment." In the lower courts, Spagnol Enterprises won $40,000 in damages, and Digital Equipment appealed.'8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Digital's lack-of-privity defense
on the authority of Kassab v. Central Soya, and rejected Digital's defenses based on the remedy limitations and warranty disclaimers in the
sales contract between Digital and its customer. The court stated:
[Tihe appellant [Digital Equipment] argues that the trial court erred by ignoring
disclaimers of warranty and limitations of liability present in the contract of sale.
This issue ignores the fact that... "there was no written agreement between DEC
and [the plaintiff] and therefore none of the disclaimers or limitations of liability
contained in the contract referred to which was entered between DEC and [the
distributor] have any application to the Appellees [Spagnol Enterprises]. There-

fore, the warranties... apply and provide a proper basis for the Trial Court's
determination of liability."'

However, R & L Grain Co. v. Chicago Eastern Corp.,' reached the
opposite result on facts strikingly similar to the facts in Spagnol Enterprises.' After consultation with the plaintiff, R & L Grain Company,
Porter Grain Systems purchased materials for a grain storage bin from
the defendant, Chicago Eastern, the company that manufactured the
bin.' The purchase price was $311,738.' Porter subsequently assem-

447. Id, at 952.
448. Id. at 949. The plaintiff was involved in every stage of the transaction between
the distributor and the manufacturer and even met with the manufacturer's sales

manager. Id.
449. Id, at 950.
450. Id
451. 246 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1968).

452. Spagtwl Enters., Inc., 568 A.2d at 952.
453. 531 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. M. 1981).
454. Like the plaintiff in the Spagnol Enterprises case, the plaintiff in the R & L
Grain case was intimately involved in the transaction between the manufacturer and
the distributor. Id. at 203-04.
455. Id. at. 203.
456. Id.
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bled the bin and sold it to R & L Grain.'7 R & L Grain eventually sued
Chicago Eastern for $700,000 to recover for both direct and consequential economic losses allegedly suffered as a result of defects in the grain
storage bin.es The complaint alleged that the defects made the bin unsafe and unsuitable for its intended purpose.' The plaintiffs theories
of recovery included breach of express warranty and breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.
The remote seller, Chicago Eastern, raised defenses that were very
similar to those raised in Spagnol Enterprises,including the lack-of-privity defense and defenses based on warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations in the contract between Chicago Eastern and Porter.' The district court rejected the lack-of-privity defense, stating:
Generally, privity of contract is a necessary element in Illinois for an action on a

warranty for economic losses. Notwithstanding, the Court finds that plaintiffs
amended complaint alleges claims based upon implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular use that are sufficient to overcome the privity requirement. The absence of privity will not bar an action upon an implied warranty
in Illinois when the circumstances attendant the sales transaction make the remote purchaser a third-party beneficiary of the contract'

The court explained that a remote purchaser will be considered a
third-party beneficiary of an implied warranty when "'the manufacturer
(1) was aware of the purpose for which the product was to be put, and
(2) knew of the third-party users' reliance that the product would be fit
for the purpose intended.'"' The district court decided that the circumstances of the sales transaction between Porter and Chicago Eastern,
made the remote purchaser, R & L Grain, a third-party beneficiary of the
manufacturer's warranties. ' As a result, the court ruled that "the absence of privity of contract does not bar plaintiff from stating implied
warranty claims .... ' That meant that R & L Grain had standing to
sue to enforce any warranties Porter received under the sales contract
with Chicago Eastern. Accordingly, Chicago Eastern's ability to avoid
liability hinged on the vitality of the warranty disclaimers and remedy
limitations in its contract with Porter.

457. Id.
458. Id. at 204.

459.
460.
461.
462.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 203-04.
at 207-08.
at 208 (citations omitted).
(quoting Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 219 N.E.2d 726,

732 (I1. App. Ct 1966)).

463. As previously stated, the plaintiff in R & L Grain was very involved in the
transactions between the manufacturer, Chicago Eastern, and the distributor, Porter.
Id. at 203-04.
464. Id. at 206.
465. Id.
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Like the plaintiff in Spagnol, R & L Grain took the position that Chicago Eastern's disclaimers and remedy limitations were not binding because R & L had purchased without notice of them. The district court
disagreed, holding that
a third-party beneficiary to a contract may not selectively enforce provisions of
the contract, but is subject to the whole contract as formed by the parties thereto.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the warranty exclusion is an effective 'exclusion
of implied warranties as to plaintiff [R & L Grain] and therefore grants defendant's
[Chicago Eastern's] motion insofar as it seeks dismissal of plaintiffs Implied warranty claims.-

In effect, the district court ruled that a third-party beneficiary takes subject to the benefits and the burdens of the contract. That seems like a
sound application of third-party beneficiary theory.
By comparison, the Groppel court's decision to reject a remote seller's

defenses based on the warranty disclaimers in the sales contract between
the remote, seller and its customer seems questionable. First, the Groppel
court reasoned by analogy to strict tort liability. Why should the vitality
of a defense in a warranty action be affected by the fact that the defense

is unavailable in a strict liability action? Despite the common origins of
the strict liability cause of action and the implied warranty action, they
are independent, albeit overlapping, causes of action.'7 Second, the

466. Id. at 209 (citations omitted). The district court also rejected the plaintiffs
argument that neither it nor Porter were ever actually aware of the warranty excluSion. The court stated:
Section 2-316 ...
provides that warranty exclusions must be conspicuous in
order to be effective. The instant warranty is reasonably noticeable, especially
to a business entity participating in an arms length transaction. The exclusion
appears . . . in boldface type. Thus, the Court finds the exclusion to be conspicuous within the meaning of section 2-316. The exclusion in the sales
contract mentions merchantability and contains language virtually tracking
that suggested by section 2-316(2) to exclude implied warranties of fitness for
a particular use ....
[Tihe well-settled body of Illinois law pertaining to
third-party beneficiaries leads the Court to conclude that the exclusion is
effective to exclude all implied warranties.

Id. at 208-09 (citations omitted).
467. Strict liability evolved from the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. Those warranties originated as a matter of social policy to compensate consumers who sustained personal injuries from defective food. WLUAM L. PROSSER & W.
PAGE KEEUN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRs § 97 at 690 (5th ed. 1984). But there
are important differences between warranty theories and the theory of strict liability
in tort For example, under the U.C.C., a seller is permitted to disclaim warranties or
limit remedies for breach of warranty. However, there are no such defenses to an
action based on strict liability in tort. As noted earlier, the section 2-607(3)(a) notice
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Groppet court may have misconstrued the language in Alternative A,
which says, "A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section."m The court evidently misunderstood this language to mean that
section 2-318 makes a seller's warranty disclaimers or remedy limitations
ineffective in section 2-318 litigation.' Such an interpretation is incorrect. Official Comment 1 to section 2-318 states:
The last sentence of this section does not mean that a seller is precluded from
excluding or disclaiming a warranty which might otherwise arise in connection
with the sale provided such exclusion or modification is permitted by Section 2316. Nor does that sentence preclude the seller from limiting the remedies of his
own buyer and of any beneficiaries in any manner provided in Sections 2-718 or 2719. To the extent that the contract contains provisions under which warranties
are excluded or modified, or remedies for breach are limited, such provisions are
equally operative against beneficiaries of warranties under this section. What this
last sentence forbids is exclusion of liability by the seller to the persons to whom
the warranties which he has made would extend under this section."m

The third sentence of Official Comment 1 deserves special attention. 7' In effect, it provides that third-party beneficiaries are entitled to
enforce whatever warranties are provided under the contract. To the extent the contract excludes or modifies warranties or limits remedies for
breach of warranty, those provisions are equally operative against the
third-party beneficiaries. The Chicago Eastern court reached this same
conclusion. Official Comment 1 does not answer the question whether
remote purchasers are bound by the seller's warranty disclaimers and
remedy limitations. The court in Chicago Eastern held that remote purchasers are bound by the seller's warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations, at least when they get heavily involved in the transactions between
the seller and the immediate purchaser. By contrast, Groppel, Patty Precision Products, and Spagnol Enterprises say just the opposite. Both

requirement can provide a defense to a breach-of-warranty action under the U.C.C.,
but there is no such defense to an action based on strict liability in tort. An action
for breach-of-warranty is usually governed by the four-year Code statute of limitation,
which generally starts to run on the day that the goods are delivered. By contrast, a
strict liability claim is governed by a tort statute of limitations, which generally starts
to run later when the injury is discovered or should have been discovered. For a
history of the theory of strict liability in tort, see William L. Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel, 50 MINN. L REV. 791 (1966); William L Prosser, The Assault Upon the Cita-

del (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
468. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1992).
469. Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d at 49, 60-61 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981).
470. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 1 (1992). In effect, the last sentence of section 2-318 prevents a seller from treating a section 2-318 plaintiff worse than a customer. For example, section 2-318 prevents sellers from using warranty disclaimers or remedy limitations that only apply to third-party beneficiaries.
471. Id.
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views are possible because Official Comment 1 does not address the
question. Cases like Chicago Eastern arguably promote the discernible
policy of Official Comment 1 to preserve the seller's right to limit her
liability for breach of warranty. On the other hand, cases like Groppel,
Patty PrecisionProducts, and Spagnol Enterprisesarguably promote the
potentially conflicting policy of Official Comment 2 "to give certain beneficiaries the benefit of the same warranty which the buyer received in
the contract of sale."" Thus, certain conflicts in the section 2-318 case
law may be attributable to, and may reflect, the potentially conflicting
policies underlying section 2-318.
3.

The Code Statute of Limitations

Jurisdictions are divided over whether the Code statute of limitations
or the tort, statute of limitations applies to a personal injury action tried
on a breach-of-warranty theory.'
In Ribley v. Harsco Corp.,'' the New York Supreme Court's appellate
division decided that the four-year Code statute of limitations governs a
nonpurchaser's breach-of-warranty claim." In Ribley, a minor instituted
a personal injury action against a farm equipment manufacturer for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The plaintiff sustained
serious injuries when her hair got caught in the drive shaft of the farm
equipment she was operating.' 6 The equipment was manufactured by
the defendant in 1961 and, following an initial sale and repossession, was
sold to the plaintiffs parents in 1966.'" The plaintiff sustained her injuries in 1973 and commenced her breach-of-warranty action approximately

472. Officil Comment 2 to section 2-318 states, in pertinent part- "The purpose of

this section is to give certain beneficiaries, the benefit of the same warranty which
the buyer received in the contract of sale." Id, § 2-318 cmt. 2.
473. See Simmons v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 747, 750 (S.D. Ala.),
ofd, 560 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1977); Ribley v. Harsco Corp., 394 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 389 A.2d 1148 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1978) ojd, 424 A.2d 497 (Pa. 1981); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
489 A.2d 660 (NJ. 1985); Teel v. American Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.
Mo. 1981); Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 981 (1981); Bowling v. Ford Motor Co., 296 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Tenn. 1968);
Lee v. Wright Tool & Forge Co., 356 N.E.2d 303 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). See also,
WHrrE AND SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 416-17.

474.
475.
476.
477.

394 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
Id. at 744.
Id. at 743.
Id.
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seven months later in 1974.1 The New York Supreme Court ruled that
the four-year Code statute of limitations'7 barred the breach-of-warranty claim, explaining:
[B]reach of warranty causes of action under the Code are primarily related to the
sales contract and are subject to all the limitations and requirements imposed by
the Code, and they are separate and distinct from a strict products liability cause
of action for injury to person or property arising out of tortious conduct on the
part of the manufacturer. Uniform Commercial Code section 2-725... provides
that an action for breach of a sales contract must be commenced within four
years of the breach.'

By contrast, Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co.' held that the tort
statute of limitations governs a nonpurchaser's breach-of-warranty claim
As previously discussed,' the plaintiff was injured when a boiler exploded. The plaintiff subsequently filed a breach-of-warranty action
against the company that manufactured the boiler and the company that
sold it to his employer. The defendants argued that the plaintiff could
not sue for breach of warranty because he was not in privity of contract
with the defendants. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the lackof-privity defense. The case hinged, therefore, upon a disputed question
of Pennsylvania law: Which statute of limitations applies to a section 2318 claim, the two-year tort statute of limitations for personal injury
actions or the four-year Code statute of limitations? ' If the four-year
Code statute of limitations was applied, the plaintiffs claim would be
time-barred.
The plaintiff argued that it would be counterproductive to strictly construe the Code statute of limitations because that would virtually eviscerate section 2-318. In this connection, the plaintiff explained that "in many
cases, the statute of limitations will have run before the injury to a third
party has occurred. " ' Thus, the plaintiff urged the court to use a limitations period that preserved the vitality of section 2-318. In particular,
the plaintiff urged the court to rule that section 2-725 begins to run on

478. Id.
479. It was unclear whether the Code statute of limitations started running at the

time of the first sale and delivery, sometime between 1961 and 1966, or when the
equipment was resold and delivered to the Ribleys in 1966. However, the Rib/ey
court did not have to decide that question because the plaintiffs breach-of-warranty
action was untimely no matter which date the statute of limitations started to run,
since the plaintiffs claim was filed eight years after the equipment was delivered to
her parents. Under section 2-725, the Code statute of limitations starts to run when
the goods are "tendered," which can be loosely translated as "delivered."
480. Ribley, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 743 (citations omitted).
481. 389 A.2d 1148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978), offd, 424 A.2d 497 (Pa. 1981).
482. See supra part IV.A.2.
483. Salvador, 389 A.2d at 1150.
484. Id. at 1151.
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the date of injury.' Naturally, the defendants favored a literal interpretation of section 2-725 because the plaintiffs warranty action would be
time-barred.
Surprisingly, the court rejected both positions and ruled that the
state's two-year tort statute of limitations applied to section 2-318
breach-of-warranty claims. The court offered a variety of justifications
for this decision. For example, at one point in the opinion, the court
seemed to be saying that a personal injury claim filed under section 2-318
is basically just a tort claim, and it is, therefore, appropriate to apply the
tort statute of limitations. The court stated:
Virtually all jurists and scholarly commentators recognize that this [section 2-318
claim ]... is purely a fiction created to reach a desirable social policy, the theory

of recovery sounds in tort .... If the theory sounds in tort rather than contract,
[then] it follows that the appropriate statute of limitations should be that which
would be applied If the plaintiffs complaint were captioned "Trespass." In
Pennsylvania that statute is two years and runs from the date of the injury.'"

The court also pointed out that judges, rather than the state legislators,
had expanded the statutorily protected class to allow a purchaser's employees to sue for breach of warranty, and as a result "the remedy for
such persons is entirely one of judicial creation.' "That being the case,
the courts should be free to choose and apply the statute of limitations
most likely to accommodate the purposes of extending Code protection
to such persons."' In addition, the court explained, "[I]t takes a very
strained reading of section 2-725 to conclude that it was ever meant to
apply to persons other than the contracting parties in breach-of-warranty
actions. " " Having determined that the two-year tort statute of limitations applied, the court dismissed the section 2-318 breach-of-warranty
claim on the grounds that it was time-barred.'
By contrast, in Spring Motors,' the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled
that the four-year Code statute of limitations governs a remote
purchaser's breach-of-warranty claim. As mentioned above,' in Spring
Motors, the plaintiff, Spring Motors Distributors, entered into contract
with the defendant Turnpike Ford Truck Sales, to purchase fourteen

485. Id
486. Id (citations omitted).

487.
488.
489.
490.

Id. at 1154.
Id.
Id at 1156 (citations omitted).
Id.

491. 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985).
492. See supra part IV.A.5.
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trucks made by the defendant Ford Motor Company,.' The trucks were
equipped with transmissions made by Clark Equipment Company, a supplier to Ford.' Spring Motors took delivery of the trucks in November
1976, and subsequently leased them to its customers.' Under those
leases, Spring Motors assumed responsibility for servicing the trucks.
Shortly thereafter, Spring Motors began experiencing problems with the
performance of the Clark transmissions. The problems persisted and,
after unsuccessfully attempting to get Clark to fLx the transmissions,
Spring Motors sued Ford, Turnpike, and Clark for breach of warranty.'
However, four years and one month had elapsed between the date of the
delivery of the trucks and the institution of the plaintiffs breach-of-warranty actions, and the court decided that Spring Motors' lawsuit was
time-barred. 7 Thus, Spring Motors stands for the proposition that the
Code statute of limitations is an effective defense to a remote
purchaser's breach-of-warranty action."
Similarly, in Teel v. American Steel Foundries,' a federal district
court decided that the four-year Code statute of limitations governed a
nonpurchaser's breach-of-warranty claim.' The complaint in that case
alleged that the plaintiff was injured during the course of employment
when a wheel of his tractor-trailer truck came loose and caused him to

493. Spring Motors Distribs., Inc., 489 A.2d at 663.

494. Id.
495. Id. at 664.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 663. The Court's ruling on the remote seller's lack of privity defense is
discussed supra part IV.A.5. The force of its arguments concerning the supremacy of
the Code evidently led the New Jersey Supreme Court to conclude that the Code
statute of limitations should be applied against a remote purchaser. Unfortunately, the
court gave no indication whether other Code defenses are effective against a remote
purchaser. In this connection, the court stated:
[W]e need not determine the outer limits of a suit by an ultimate purchaser
against a remote supplier for economic loss. Therefore, we reserve determination on the effectiveness of a remote manufacturer's disclaimer or [remedy]
limitation on express and implied warranties to an ultimate purchaser that
did not have the opportunity to negotiate over the terms of the agreement ....
We also leave unreviewed the Code requirement that a purchaser
notify the seller about the defective condition of the product.
Id. Nevertheless, the logic of the court's position that the Code provides the appropriate analytical framework for commercial transactions leads to the conclusion that, in
an appropriate situation, the warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations in a
manufacturer's contract with its immediate customer could be raised against a remote
purchaser.

499. 529 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
500. Id, at 342-43.
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lose control of the truck and crash."l The plaintiff subsequently instituted a personal injury action against the wheel manufacturer, American
Steel Foundries, and the company, White Motor, that sold the truck to
his employer.' The complaint alleged breach of express warranty and
breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.'
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of
both lack of privity and that the complaint was time-barred by the state's
one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.' The plaintiff argued logically that the Code statute of limitations should be applied
to a breach-of-warranty claim filed under Code section 2 -31 8 .1 The defendants argued that the state's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions should be applied because the complaint was basically a
personal injury claim.' Lacking any pertinent state court decisions, the
district court chose to apply the Code statute of limitations because it
was longer.' This decision did not dispose of the case, however, because the Court had to decide when the four-year Code statute of limitations started running.' Ironically, the plaintiff took the position that
section 2-725 begins to run on the date of injury. The court rejected
the plaintiffs argument as contrary to the plain language of section 2725."1' Taking the statute at face value, the court decided that the Code
statute of limitations began to run on the date that the truck was delivered to the plaintiff's employer.""

501. Id. at 340.

502. Id.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id. at 342.

508. Id.
509. Id. at 342.
510. Id. Section 2-725(2) states:
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach-of-warranty occurs
when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly
extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach
must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when
the breach is or should have been discovered.
U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1992).

511. Teel, 529 F. Supp. at 343. The plaintiffs complaint failed to state when the
tractor was delivered to plaintiffs employer and, as a result, the court was unable to
dismiss the complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations. The court then
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To summarize, there is a split of authority concerning the appropriate
statute of limitations to apply to a personal ijury action that is tried on
a breach-of-warranty theory. Some jurisdictions apply the Code statute of

limitations."' Others rule that when personal injuries are sustained from
a breach of warranty, the action is subject to the tort statute of limitations for personal injuries." In the final analysis, these conflicts in the

case law suggest that the courts may be struggling to reconcile the consumer protection policies underlying U.C.C. section 2-318 with the potentially conflicting policies underlying U.C.C. section 2-725.'"
4.

Summary and Conclusions: Defenses Based On Notice

Requirements, Warranty Disclaimers, Remedy Limitations, and
the Statute of Limitations
Although the Code provides defenses based on notice requirements,
warranty disclaimers, remedy limitations, and the statute of limitations,

there are conflicts among the jurisdictions regarding the availability of
such defenses in section 2-318 litigation. For example, the preceding
cases indicate that some jurisdictions reject the lack-of-notice defense in
personal injury cases. But when the plaintiff is suing to recover for eco-

nomic losses, the courts seem to be more willing to permit the defense.

moved to the lack-of-privity defense. Since the plaintiff was not in the statutorily
protected group, the lack-of-privity defense prevailed and the Court dismissed the
complaint, stating, "Had the legislature intended employees of buyers to obtain the
benefits of a warranty, they could have enacted either Alternative B or C." lId at
345.
512. See, e.g., Ribley v. Harsco Corp., 394 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); Spring
Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (NJ. 1985); Teel v. American
Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
513. See, e.g., Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 389 A.2d 1148 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1978), ofj'd, 424 A.2d 497 (Pa. 1981); Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); Bowling v. Ford Motor Co., 296 F.
Supp. 312 (E.D. Tenn. 1968); Lee v. Wright Tool & Forge Co., 356 N.E.2d 303 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1975).
514. The policy of section 2-725 is to establish a reasonable and uniform limitations
period for breach-of-warranty claims beyond which merchants may destroy their business records without weakening their ability to defend themselves against products
liability claims. Thus, the Official Comment states, in pertinent part, that the purpose
of Code § 2-725 is as follows:
To introduce a uniform statute of limitations for sales contracts, thus eliminating the jurisdictional variations and providing needed relief for concerns
doing business on a nationwide scale whose contracts have heretofore been
governed by several different periods of limitation depending upon the state
in which the transaction occurred. This Article... selects a four-year period
as the most appropriate to modem business practice. This is within the normal commercial record-keeping period.
U.C.C. § 2-725 cmt. 1 (1992).
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In addition, the preceding discussion demonstrates that some jurisdictions reject defenses based on warranty disclaimers or remedy limitations when the plaintiff is a remote purchaser. Finally, the discussion
above shows that the jurisdictions are divided over the question whether
the Code statute of limitations or the tort statute of limitations applies to
litigation under U.C.C. section 2-318.
V.

CONCLUSION

The courts apparently have no difficulty applying Code section 2-318,
Alternative A, in cases where the plaintiff is a nonpurchaser in the
buyer's family or household, or is a houseguest who is suing a direct
seller on a breach-of-warranty theory to recover for personal injury.
Those cases are clearly within the statutory language and the courts
uniformly grant the plaintiffs standing to sue. Conversely, the lack-ofprivity defense generally prevails when a nonpurchaser plaintiff is not a
member of the purchaser's family or household, 1 ' or when a nonprivity
plaintiff is suing to recover for property damage or economic losses,1 "
or is not a natural person,"" or the defendant is a remote seller."'
However, there are non-conforming cases where the lack-of-privity
defense fails despite the fact that the nonpurchaser plaintiff is not in the
purchaser's family or household. That happens when jurisdictions selectively abolish the privity bar and extend warranty protection beyond
Alternative A's statutorily protected class to other types of
nonpurchasers. 6 Purchasers' employees tend to be the primary beneficiaries of this type of common-law development abolishing horizontal
privity.' There are other non-conforming cases where the lack-of-privity defense fails when the defendant is not a direct seller but rather a remote seller. That happens when the jurisdictions have abolished the
vertical privity bar and extended warranty liability to remote sellers,"
or because of well-established common-law exceptions to privity requirements.m=

515. See supm part IV.A.2.
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To some extent, the perceived confusion in the section 2-318 case law
is the result of ambiguity in the governing statute and the Official Comments interpreting the statute. For example, the ambiguity of Official
Comment 3 has permitted the courts to reach contradictory conclusions
concerning the propriety of abolishing the horizontal privity bar in order
to extend warranty protection to nonpurchasers who are not in the statutorily protected class described in Alternative A. Similarly, the "neutrality" of Alternative A on questions of vertical privity has permitted the
courts to reach different conclusions concerning the propriety of expanding the class of potential defendants to include remote sellers.
In addition, the perceived confusion in the case law is to some degree
the result of the potentially conflicting policies underlying section 2-318.
And, to some extent, it is the result of the potential policy conflicts between section 2-318 and other Code provisions such as the statute of
limitations or the notice defense. For example, Official Comment 1 to
section 2-318 reflects a concern for preserving the seller's right to limit
her liability for breach of warranty through the use of warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations. By contrast, Official Comment 2 reflects the
potentially conflicting policy decision "to give certain beneficiaries the
benefit of the same warranty which the buyer received in the contract of
sale."' Chicago Eastern arguably promoted the policy of Official Comment 1 by dismissing a remote purchaser's breach-of-warranty action as
barred by the warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations in the contract between the seller and the immediate purchaser. By contrast,
Groppel, Patty Precision Products, and Spagnol Enterprises arguably
favored the conflicting policy of Official Comment 2 by rejecting defenses based on the warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations. One result
of the policy conflicts in this area is that the courts may be uncertain
about which set of policies to favor.
There is an even more basic explanation of the perceived confusion in
this body of case law-a class of nonprivity plaintiffs has been given
asylum in the last citadel of privity. In other words, various types of
nonprivity plaintiffs have been granted standing to enforce derivative
rights in a carefully conceived and well-integrated system of rights and
remedies that takes privity for granted. The courts seem to be struggling
to determine how to integrate section 2-318 nonprivity plaintiffs into the
Code's framework without eviscerating major provisions of the Code
such as the notice requirement, or the statute of limitations, or the

523. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt 1 (1992).
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seller's ability to exclude or limit its liability. In the. final analysis, the
n
u
state legislatures may have to help the courts solve this dilemma

524. Some states have taken steps to address some of these problems. For example,
Massachusetts has adopted the following non-standard version of section 2-318:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any
action brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier of goods to
recover damages for breach-of-warranty, express or implied, or for negligence,
although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the defendant if the
plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier might
reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods. The
manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section. Failure to give notice shall not bar recovery under this section unless the defendant proves that he was prejudiced thereby. All actions
under this section shall be commenced within three years next after the date
the injury and damage occurs.
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West Supp. 1993). Notice that the Massachusetts statute resolves several problems. For example, it clearly and specifically states
that lack of privity is not a defense in a breach-of-warranty action against a manufacturer, seller, supplier, or lessor. In addition, it establishes a rebuttable presumption that.
weakens the vitality of the notice defenses. Furthermore, it resolves the question of
what the applicable statute of limitations should be.
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